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Test anxiety is characterized by apprehension, panic, and ruminating thoughts of
potential failure that are experienced during an exam situation. In a test conscious
society, students’ lives are significantly affected by their test performance. Tests are
used to measure and determine thresholds in education, career placement and
advancement. Possibly due to pressure to perform well, students often experience
heightened stress and anxiety during tests, and thus test anxiety has become a
pervasive problem. This study investigated attentional bias among a test-anxious
sample. It is suggested that test-anxious individuals have a tendency to use a
disproportionate amount of their cognitive resources scanning the test environment for
possible signs of threat. That is, high test-anxious students have an attentional bias for
threatening stimuli related to a testing situation. In the present study, attentional bias
was investigated using a Stroop color-naming task and an attentional dot probe task
among a sample of undergraduate students. The rationale for using these tasks is that
attentional bias toward threatening stimuli would be indicated by delayed color-naming
responses (Stroop task) and accelerated responses to probes replacing threatening

words (attentional dot-probe task). During these tasks, participants were shown various
words that either contained test-threat (e.g., test), test-threat control (e.g., shoe),
general threat (e.g., abuse), or general threat control (e.g., elbow). Participants were
also assessed for state, trait, and test anxiety. Initially, differences in attentional bias
were not found between high test-anxious and low test-anxious participants; however,
an elevation in state anxiety (due to an upcoming exam) was shown to activate
attentional bias among high test-anxious participants. High test-anxious participants
who had an upcoming exam demonstrated an attentional bias for test-threat words
compared to low test-anxious participants who did not have an upcoming exam.
Furthermore, it was found that high test-anxious participants (compared to low testanxious participants) demonstrated an attentional bias for test-threatening stimuli
compared to neutral stimuli whether or not participants had an upcoming exam.
Overall, this study showed that high test-anxious individuals have an increased
susceptibility to distraction when receiving an anxiety-provoking stressor (e.g., words
containing test threat). Attentional bias among test-anxious individuals has important
implications for test anxiety research including classification of test anxiety separate
from other anxiety types (e.g., social anxiety disorder, generalized anxiety disorder) and
the development of coping strategies and effective treatments for students.
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Chapter 1.
INTRODUCTION
In a test-conscious society, students’ lives are significantly affected by
their test performance (Spielberger & Vagg, 1995). Tests are an important
part of society in that they are used to measure and determine thresholds in
education, career placement, and advancement. As society continues to
grow and evolve, test performance will probably become an increasingly
greater factor in determining success (e.g., admission to college, admission to
graduate school, and professional exams; Zeidner, 1998). Possibly due to
pressure to perform well, among other factors, students often experience
heightened stress and anxiety during tests; thus, test anxiety has become a
pervasive problem over the years (Spielberger & Vagg, 1995).
Anxiety: Fear and Panic
Anxiety is “normal,” but it may become a problem if it is distressing or
disabling. Anxiety is often viewed as a disorder if it is associated with
personal distress; with maladaptive behavior, such as impaired coordination,
stereotyped behavior, or avoidance; or with harmless situations. The
elements of anxiety include a subjective feeling state (e.g., tension,
apprehension), behavioral responses (e.g., impaired performance, avoidance
of certain situations), and certain physiological responses (e.g., increased
heart rate, respiration; Barlow, 2001).
The distinction between fear, anxiety, and panic can be quite subtle,
but they have distinctive and significant differences. Fear is “a reaction to a
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specific observable danger” (Barlow, 2001, p. 8); anxiety is a diffuse,
objectless apprehension in anticipation of future danger or misfortune that is
accompanied by an unpleasant mood or somatic symptoms (Barlow, 2001);
and a panic attack is “a sudden onset of intense apprehension, fearfulness, or
terror, often associated with feelings of impending doom” (American
Psychiatric Association, 2000, p. 429) occurring at an inappropriate time
(Barlow, 2001). Anxiety disorders are marked by the presence of anxiety or
panic attacks associated with distress or impairment (American Psychiatric
Association, 2000).
Phobia
Specific phobia involves “marked and persistent fear of clearly
discernible, circumscribed objects or situations” (American Psychiatric
Association, 2000, p. 443). Subtypes include animal (e.g., mice, spiders,
snakes), natural environment (e.g., storms, heights, water), blood-injectioninjury (e.g., medical procedure, injections, blood withdrawals), situational
(e.g., public transportation, bridges, enclosed spaces), and other phobias
(e.g., the number 13, vomiting; American Psychiatric Association, 2000).
Typically, treatment of specific phobia includes a systematic program of
therapeutic exposure to relevant stimuli. The exposure can be gradual or
confrontive, in the imagination or in real life (Barlow, Raffa, & Cohen, 2002).
Social phobia involves “marked and persistent fear of social
performance situations in which embarrassment may occur” (American
Psychiatric Association, 2000, p. 450). Social phobia may be generalized
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(e.g., social anxiety disorder) if the anxiety is related to most social situations.
It is important to recognize that “general interpersonal shyness, perhaps
combined with social skill deficits, may not equate with social phobia”
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000, p. 534-535) and is more than
inflated shyness. For example, many famous media people, stage
performers, and athletes may have social phobia without being “shy” (Barlow,
2001). Treatment of social phobia usually includes behavior rehearsal (e.g.,
modeling and role playing) in groups, plus cognitive therapy (Heimberg,
1989).
Classification, Descriptive Pathology, and Prevalence of Test Anxiety
There is no formal diagnostic classification of test anxiety, and it is not
quite clear whether test anxiety belongs with specific or social phobia
(Zeidner, 1998). However, test anxiety probably should be classified as a
specific phobia. Although social phobia has components in common with test
anxiety such as fear of performance and evaluation, the premise of social
phobia reflects social situations and fear of being humiliated or embarrassed.
Individuals with test anxiety often report that they are able to socialize and
function in social situations without any difficulties. Specific phobia, on the
other hand, suggests anxiety or apprehension of a feared object or situation.
Thus, individuals can be diagnosed with test-anxiety with out necessarily
meeting criteria for social phobia (Zeidner, 1998).
Test anxiety is characterized by uneasiness, apprehension,
hopelessness, and expectations of failure (Seiber, 1980; Zeidner, 1998).
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Normally, it occurs as an established set of responses to stimuli, based upon
the student’s past experiences in testing situations (Sieber, 1980). Test
anxiety is experienced before, during, or after an examination and is
commonly attributed to concern, worry, or fear. Almost everyone has
experienced test anxiety at one time or another, however, some students
experience anxiety to such an extent that it interferes with test-taking, and as
a result, academic performance may be seriously affected (Spielberger &
Vagg, 1995). Students with test anxiety often experience ruminating thoughts
about potential failure accompanied by emotional distress and physiological
arousal that is frequently interpreted as threatening and dangerous. When
they sit down for the exam, they experience panic and thoughts of failure,
leading them to believe that the testing situation represents a potential
catastrophe (Maxfield & Melnyk, 2000; Sieber, 1980). These negative
cognitions prevent successful test-taking by distracting the student’s attention
from the exam itself and interfering with the student’s ability to analyze the
question and formulate or select the correct answer. Test anxiety not only
affects the test-taking experience itself, it may even cause avoidant behavior
wherein a student avoids studying and preparation for upcoming exams. The
anticipation of expected failure may lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy (Leary &
Kowalski, 1995; Maxfield & Melnyk, 2000; Zeidner, 1998).
The prevalence of test anxiety among school and college-age students
is widespread. It is estimated that in a typical classroom of 20 children, two or
three will be highly anxious in a test-taking situation (e.g., an exam). For
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college populations, the prevalence of test anxiety of students in the United
States experiencing debilitating stress during evaluative situations is
estimated to be between 15% and 20% (Hill, 1984). This means that millions
of students regularly experience test anxiety to the extent that it affects their
current performance and, perhaps, even their future goals (Hill, 1984;
Zeidner, 1998).
Early Studies of Test Anxiety
From the perspective of biology, Darwin (1872) described fear as a
characteristic common to both humans and non-human animals (Spielberger
& Vagg, 1995). Defining it in terms of physiological arousal, he described the
components of fear that include increased heart rate, dry mouth, increased
respiration, choking, shaking, numbness in fingers and toes, and feeling
flushed, all of which are now attributed to the activation of the autonomic
nervous system. In contrast to Darwin’s physiological manifestations of fear,
Freud (1936) focused on anxiety, which he described as subjective
experiences associated with fear reactions. Freud (1936) described anxiety
as being either “realistic” (i.e., normal), which is caused by a real danger in
the environment, or “neurotic” (i.e., abnormal), which is caused by irrational
threats stemming from internal dangers (Spielberger & Vagg, 1995). In a
testing situation, many students experience normal anxiety (e.g.,
nervousness, tension), however, when irrational threats arise from
physiological arousal, test anxiety becomes pathological, and should be
investigated.
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In early studies, test anxiety theory was primarily based upon
physiological responses experienced by students. Folin, Demis, and Smillie
(1914) examined test anxiety among medical students and it was reported
that 20% of students presented with unusually high levels of glucose in their
urine (i.e., glycosuria) after a stressful exam. The presence of glycosuria was
not evident in the students prior to the exam. Similarly, Cannon (1929), who
was investigating homeostasis and the autonomic nervous system, found
evidence of glycosuria following a stressful exam.
Bloch and Brackenridge (1972) obtained blood samples from medical
students after an important exam. They found a strong negative correlation
between self-rated exam performances and high plasma cholesterol levels, a
physiological indicator of stress. Students who reported themselves as
performing poorly had unusually high plasma cholesterol levels in their blood
compared to students who rated themselves as performing well on the exam.
These earlier studies demonstrated the existence of physiological
responses and biological changes in the body, presumably due to anxiety.
This led to more studies that focused on physiological properties of test
anxiety. However, these studies did not identify emotional states that are
typically experienced during the exams (Spielberger & Vagg, 1995). In the
late 1930s, Brown (1938) and other researchers became quite concerned
about the effects of test anxiety after two suicides at the University of
Chicago. The researchers’ goals were to study test anxiety in depth and to
develop a successful approach to treat it (Zeidner, 1998).
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Components of Test Anxiety
Worry and emotionality. According to Liebert and Morris (1967), test
anxiety consists of two parts, a worry component and an emotionality
component. Worry is conceptualized as cognitive concerns regarding the
exam and exam performance. Such concerns focus around negative
cognitions (e.g., preoccupation with test performance), potential negative
consequences (e.g., failure), and comparison of one’s ability to others’ (e.g., “I
will be the only one who fails”). Worry can be elicited by internal or external
cues that arise during an exam. For example, students may perceive that
their ability to cope is inadequate, and thus failure is imminent. Students’
worries stem primarily from memories of previous evaluative situations and
are learned based upon success or failure (Zeidner, 1998).
Research has demonstrated that expectation of successful
performance and worry are negatively correlated (Spielberger & Vagg, 1995).
Wine (1971) found that highly anxious students who performed poorly on an
exam scored high on worry, suggesting poor performance was attributed to
worrisome cognitions (e.g., self-blame for potential failure), and this in turn
distracted the student from the task at hand (e.g., the exam). Students who
scored high on worry often concerned themselves with past exam disasters
and berated themselves for not studying properly or for forgetting the answers
to simple exam questions (Covington, 1984).
Emotionality is conceptualized as the student’s awareness of his or her
physiological and autonomic arousal during a testing situation (e.g.,
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nervousness, tension, perspiration; Liebert & Morris, 1967). Both high testanxious and low test-anxious students experience emotionality; however, they
differed in the intensity of physiological arousal (e.g., heart rate). For
example, Deffenbacher (1986) examined 156 students who were evaluated
as high test-anxious and low test-anxious. High test-anxious students had
more elevated heartbeats (e.g., M = 79 beats/min) compared to the low testanxious students (e.g., M = 70 beats/min) during an evaluative situation.
Likewise, other research found that heart rates between high test-anxious and
low test-anxious students were significantly different under evaluative
conditions (Montgomery, 1977; Zeidner, 1998).
However, when examining emotionality that encompasses
physiological arousal as a whole (e.g., perspiration, nervousness, sweating,
difficulty breathing) in which heart rate is not singled out, emotionality in
general does not correlate with performance. Several studies have
demonstrated a low correlation between emotionality and test performance.
For example, emotionality and reading test performance were unrelated (i.e.,
r = 0.03), however, worry and performance were significantly negatively
correlated (e.g., r = -0.29) among their sample of students (Morris & Perez,
1972). Similarly, Morris and Liebert (1970) reported that emotionality was
unrelated to test performance, while worry was negatively related to test
performance among a college sample (Deffenbacher, 1980).
State-trait test anxiety. According to Spielberger (1972)
state anxiety may be conceptualized as a
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transitory emotional state or condition of the human
organism that varies in intensity and fluctuates over time.
The condition is characterized by subjective, consciously
perceived feelings of tension and apprehension, and
activation of the autonomic nervous system (Spielberger,
1972, p. 39).
In a testing situation, state anxiety is conceptualized as a situation-specific
form of test anxiety that encompasses both worry and emotionality. It is
characterized as an emotional state that a student may experience during an
evaluative situation (e.g., the anxious effect provoked by an exam; Hong &
Karstensson, 2002). A student may consciously experience nervousness,
tension, worry, disorganization, apprehension, fear, or even feel a sense of
danger in response to physiological arousal from the autonomic nervous
system (e.g., increased heart rate, perspiration, dry mouth). The emotional
states are often accompanied by ruminating thoughts of failure and
hopelessness. State anxiety often fluctuates depending upon the extent of
the student’s perceived threat created by factors such as how well prepared
the student was for the exam (e.g., amount of time studying, studying the
correct topics), the type of test questions (e.g., multiple choice, essay),
difficulty level of the test question (superficial versus deep knowledge), and
individual differences in personality characteristics (Spielberger, 1972;
Spielberger & Vagg, 1995; Zeidner 1998).
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Trait anxiety can be difficult to isolate and measure directly because it
is not typically manifested in behavior. Spielberger defines trait anxiety as
relatively stable individual differences in anxiety proneness,
that is, to differences in the disposition to perceive a wide
range of stimulus situations as dangerous or threatening,
and in the tendency to respond to such threats with state
[anxiety] reactions. Trait [anxiety] may also be regarded as
reflecting individual differences in the frequency and the
intensity with which state [anxiety] have been manifested in
the past, and in the possibility that such states will be
experienced in the future (Spielberger, 1972, p. 39).
In a testing situation, a student has the ability to perceive and interpret an
exam situation as being more or less threatening or dangerous. Thus, trait
anxiety is characterized as the ability to perceive or interpret a testing
situation to which the student responds with more or less intensity of state
anxiety (e.g., apprehension, worry; Spielberger 1972; Spielberger & Vagg,
1995). For example, students who score high on trait anxiety are likely to
interpret the exam situation as being more threatening compared to students
who scored lower on trait anxiety. Thus, high trait anxious students are more
likely to experience state anxiety of greater intensity and frequency (Zeidner,
1998), greater physiological arousal, more worry cognitions, and increased
task-irrelevant thoughts that distract the student’s attention away from test
performance compared to low trait anxious students (Spielberger, 1978).
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Four-factor theory of test anxiety. Sarason (1984) expanded the test
anxiety construct that went beyond worry and emotionality. He described the
construct of test anxiety as encompassing four factors: tension, worry, bodily
symptoms, and test irrelevant thoughts. Tension is described as the
emotional feelings that one experiences prior to or during an exam (e.g.,
distress, uneasiness, anxiety, feeling jittery). Worry is described as thoughts
relative to exam performance (e.g., potential failure, performance of others,
consequences). Test-irrelevant thinking is described as thoughts and
concerns that divert the student’s attention away from the exam itself (e.g.,
irrelevant bits of information that “pop up”, thoughts unrelated to the exam,
thoughts about past events). Bodily reactions are described as physiological
symptoms just prior to or during an exam (e.g., headache, upset stomach,
increased heart rate). Tension and bodily symptoms are considered as part
of emotionality, whereas worry and test-irrelevant thoughts are considered to
be cognitive processes.
To measure these four components, Sarason (1984) developed the
40-item Reactions to Tests Scale (RTT). The RTT has four 10-item
subscales, each of which measures one of the components. The RTT has
demonstrated zero order correlations among the subscales that ranged from r
= 0.24 to r = 0.69. Examination of the correlation between the RTT and the
Test Anxiety Scale (another validated measure of test anxiety; Sarason,
1978) shows that coefficients for each of the 10-item scales ranged from r =
0.68 to r = 0.81. For all 40 items, total scale reliability equaled r = 0.78.

12
Benson and Bandalos (1992) have demonstrated coefficient alphas for each
of the subscales of the RTT even higher than Sarason’s (1984) sample, with
coefficient alphas for each of the four subscales ranging from r = 0.85 to r =
0.92. The total scale reliability was reported as r = 0.95. Benson and
Bandalos (1992) went on to develop a shorter 20-item scale revision of the
RTT that demonstrated proven alpha coefficients that ranged from r = 0.64 to
r = 0.92. Validity and reliability are very similar between the 40- and 20-item
measures and are comparable in their effectiveness in measuring the four
components of test anxiety; however, the shorter form has the advantage of
being quicker to administer and score.
Etiological Models of Test Anxiety
Transactional process model of test anxiety. Spielberger and Vagg
(1995) describe the transactional process of test anxiety as being situation
specific and involving a temporal sequence of events. The transactional
process model distinguishes between a series of events that takes place
during an evaluative situation. These events include the examination itself
(e.g., stressor), the student’s subjective interpretation about the stressor as
more or less intense (e.g., threat), the emotional states that are experienced
during an exam (e.g., anxiety), cognitive appraisals (e.g., irrational thinking),
coping strategies (e.g., avoidance), and consequences (e.g., exam
performance).
When a student begins the exam process, according to Spielberger
and Vagg (1995), the exam itself will be interpreted as being more threatening

13
or less threatening according to the student. This interpretation depends
upon the extent of the student’s trait anxiety (e.g., personality characteristics,
individual differences). The student will then appraise the exam condition. If
the student interprets the exam as more threatening, then the student is likely
to experience an elevation in state anxiety (e.g., worry, apprehension,
ruminating thoughts of failure, test irrelevant thoughts). The emotional
responses provide feedback that can alter or reinforce the appraisal of the
exam as being more threatening or less threatening. For example, if a
student is considered to be test-wise (e.g., demonstrate proficient test-taking
skills), they may think the exam situation is less threatening compared to a
student who is considered to be less test-wise.
Appraisals of the exam correspond to the student’s knowledge of the
exam material. If the student is able to answer a question correctly,
especially at the beginning of the exam, then state anxiety is likely to lower
along with increased positive cognitive appraisals (e.g., “I am confident that I
will pass this exam”). On the other hand, if a student’s knowledge of the
exam material is weak and they are not able to respond to questions
correctly, they are likely to experience a negative emotional response
including tension, worry, and physiological arousal. The rise in state anxiety
may lead to the student appraising the exam situation as more threatening
which, in turn, will likely reinforce negative cognitive appraisals and self blame
(e.g., “I should have studied longer”).
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The final stage of the transactional process model is the formulation of
answers to the exam questions (e.g., retrieving information from memory).
Poor performance is likely to cause emotional responses and cognitive
appraisals that may ultimately interfere with information retrieval, attention,
and concentration that will contribute to poor performance.
According to Vagg and Spielberger (1995), students who are high testanxious consider examinations as a significant threat to which they respond
with more intense emotionality and negative worry cognitions compared to
students who are low test-anxious. Emotional responses interfere with
concentration and attention due to task irrelevant thoughts, and worry
cognitions interfere with information processing and the ability to retrieve
information from memory. Treatments that are primarily focused on
addressing emotional responses (e.g., alleviating anxiety) and cognitive worry
(e.g., modifying irrational beliefs) during examinations have been beneficial by
reducing test anxiety (e.g., cognitive-behavioral therapies). Hembree (1998)
suggested, through a meta-analysis of test anxiety treatments, that cognitivebehavioral therapies of test anxiety are successful in reducing worry and
emotionality. In general, cognitive-behavioral therapies have demonstrated a
rise in performance (e.g., course grade) among school-aged students by
approximately one-half of a standard deviation and in post-secondary
students by approximately three-quarters of a standard deviation (Zeidner,
1998).
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Empirical research investigating treatment of test anxiety by targeting
emotional reactions and cognitive appraisals has demonstrated promising
results (Hembree, 1998; Zeidner, 1998). Although relatively little is known
about the development of antecedents of test anxiety, more research is
needed to investigate a student’s strengths and weaknesses when taking an
exam in order to develop effective treatments that will meet that student’s
particular needs. The majority of the studies were limited to only specific
segments of the transactional process model (e.g., emotionality, worry; Vagg
& Spielberger, 1995; Zeidner, 1998), but very little was investigated with
respect to a student’s dynamic relationship between worry and emotionality.
Schutz, Davis, and Schwanenflugel (2002) suggest that the relationship
between students’ perceived ability and the way in which they organize
specific concepts during exams is also important (e.g., perception of ability to
cope with exam stress).
Concept organization model of test anxiety. Understanding the way
students organize their personal concepts during an exam is likely to shed
some light on important aspects of the test-taking experience (e.g., what
environmental cues are students likely to attend to, strategies students use to
regulate their behavior; Clark, 1987; Saarni, 1998). The way an individual
organizes personal emotional concepts regarding a specific event depends
upon personal experiences and how they regulate appraisal processes.
Students who are considered to be high test-anxious (versus low test-
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anxious) are likely to have varying concepts about the testing situation
(Schutz, Davis, & Schwanenflugel, 2002).
Schutz et al. (2002) discuss theories of emotion and emotion
regulation that influence the way students experience thoughts and feelings
during an exam. They discuss four conceptual sub-domains: cognitive
appraisals, task-focusing, emotion-focusing, and emotion-experiences.
According to Schutz et al. (2002) cognitive appraisals occur when a
student assesses the testing situation in relation to his or her goals. In order
for anxiety to emerge, a student must consider the exam to be important. As
the student’s perception of the importance of the exam lessens, so also does
the emergence of anxiety. Thus, the thoughts relevant to the importance of
the examination are the primary component regulating an emotional
response. The perception of what is actually happening in relation to the
student’s goals of the test-taking experience is the second component of
cognitive appraisals (Schutz et al. 2002). That is, in order to achieve the
student’s goals, specific events must take place (e.g., ability to recall certain
information, responding correctly to a certain percentage of questions) in
order to achieve the expected grade. The third component of cognitive
appraisal is the perception of the student’s ability to cope and handle the test
(e.g., having the confidence to deal with challenging questions, strategies to
guess at multiple choice options).
Task-focusing as described by Schutz et al. (2002) is the student’s
ability to focus and manage the task at hand (e.g., the exam itself). Task-
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focusing consists of processes such as reading directions, analyzing
important concepts of an exam question, strategically keeping track of and
managing time, selecting the best multiple-choice options, and checking
answers. The processes are designed to help maintain focus on the exam
and away from task-irrelevant and unpleasant thoughts.
Emotion-focusing is described as occurring when the student’s
attention drifts away from the exam to their own emotions about the exam
(Schutz et al. 2002). That is, the student’s focus is disengaged from the
exam itself and is instead on the student’s thoughts and feelings about their
performance. For example, the student may emphasize the test’s
importance, blame one’s self for not studying enough, or wonder how others
are doing. The emotion-focusing process may actually reduce or elevate a
student’s anxiety. For instance, a student may engage in self-talk that
deemphasizes the test importance, thus reducing anxiety. However, a
student may engage in self-blame and list things that should have studied or
done to better prepare for the test, resulting in an elevation of anxiety (Schutz
et al., 2002).
Emotion-experiences are described by Schutz et al. (2002) as the
types of emotions that the student is experiencing. These emotions can be
pleasant (e.g., pride, satisfaction) or unpleasant (e.g., anger, hopelessness).
The distinction is based upon cognitive appraisals. If the student’s goals are
being met and the exam is going as expected, then pleasant emotions are
likely to emerge such as feeling pride and contentment. However, if the exam
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is not going as expected, then unpleasant emotions are likely to emerge such
as feeling disappointed or angry. Furthermore, if a student believes that he or
she cannot effectively cope with the exam, the experience of anxiety is more
likely.
In order to test concept organization and the relationship that exists
between them, Schutz et al. (2002) instructed participants to rate the degree
of relationship between the above concepts with respect to test anxiety during
an exam. They found that among the low to moderate test-anxious students,
the students distinguished concepts based upon their ability to regulate taskfocusing and emotion-focusing processes. That is, low to moderate testanxious students had a tendency to rate their ability to focus on the task at
hand as successful and typically experienced emotions that were described
as being pleasant. Among the high test-anxious students, however,
emotional regulation was significantly correlated with feelings of anxiety,
hopelessness, shame, and anger, and ability to focus at the task at hand was
less successful. With respect to cognitive appraisals, when the low to
moderate test-anxious students endorsed feeling confident, certain, or in
control during the exam, these were significantly correlated with the
endorsement of pleasant emotions (e.g., pride, enjoyment, satisfaction).
However, high test-anxious students viewed task-focusing strategies as being
correlated to unpleasant emotions (e.g., anxiety, anger). The use of
strategies (e.g., task-focusing) was higher among the high test-anxious
students compared to the low test-anxious students. They reported spending
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more time reading directions, checking answers as well as a reporting high
anxiety.
Schutz et al. (2002) suggest that the results demonstrated evidence of
attentional bias among students who were highly anxious (e.g., scanning the
test environment for possible signs of threat; Eysenck, 1992). Attentional bias
is speculated to be caused by their ability to find unpleasant emotions
intertwined with the test-taking process and greater use of test-taking
strategies. Although the researchers did not investigate attentional bias
directly, it is noteworthy that the way in which high test-anxious students
organize their concepts during test-taking is significantly different compared to
low test-anxious students. Specifically, high test-anxious students organize
their concepts based on their feelings of anxiety compared to low test-anxious
students who organize concepts based on their ability focus on the task at
hand. A reasonable approach to investigate why high test-anxious individuals
organize their concepts differently compared to low test-anxious individuals
can be explained in terms of cognitive schemas and attentional bias theories.
Cognitive Schemas
According to Williams, Watts, MacLeod, and Matthews (1997), it would
be highly inefficient to understand each new situation without the ability to
reference previous similar situations. A schema is basically a memory
structure used to store a body of knowledge regarding a specific event or
situation. Thus, a schema can be used as a template to organize new
information. The schema itself is generic with abstract prototypical
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representations of specific events or situations. For instance, in the most
general sense, each individual has a specific schema related to taking a
college exam. One might enter the classroom and do a last-minute review of
his or her notes. The instructor then announces for everyone to put their
books and notes away and proceeds to pass out the exam. The individual
then reads and answers each question to the best of his or her ability. This
schema can be activated with future exam situations, even if the situation is
different (e.g., SAT, college exams, written drivers license exam).
The function of a schema, according to Williams et al. (1997) involves
identifying the appropriate memory structure and then applying it to manage a
specific event. If specific elements deviate from the schematic
representation, then more attention is allocated to these elements. The
hypothesis of filtering and attention elaboration explains this phenomenon.
Filtering. Information typical of the schema becomes cohesively
organized, but atypical material is only weakly associated in the final
representation. Filtering predicts an advantageous recall for typical
information compared to atypical material. In other words, typical material is
incorporated into a generic schema related to a specific event or situation.
For instance, a student may have a schema for typical events during the
exam situation such as paper and pencil format, no book or notes allowed, no
talking, specific time limit, or the exam being related to the material discussed
during previous lectures. However, atypical events such as the instructor
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providing everyone with pizza may not qualify in the exam-related schema.
Thus, in future exam situations, a student is not likely to expect pizza.
Attention elaboration. There is a memory advantage with atypical
material. This is due to the fact that schemas of atypical material attract
disproportionate processing resources during encoding. In other words,
events or material that are atypical of the event or situation, stand apart and
individuals have a greater ability to recall such material. For instance, during
an exam situation, the professor provides students with pizza. Although
being provided pizza during the exam is not typical of what one might expect
during an exam, it is likely to be remembered.
Theoretical constructs of frames and scripts are a useful method of
developing formulations of schemas. Both frames and scripts represent
modules of generic information. “Processing an input involves assigning
elements to appropriate slots in the relevant frame or script” (Williams et al.,
1997, p. 216). Frames represent organized relationships from simple to
complex rule defined systems (e.g., a car in the United States has the driving
controls on the left side of the vehicle) and scripts represent a subset of
frames involving temporal sequence of events (e.g., the process of starting a
vehicle and driving; Williams et al., 1997).
Understanding cognitive schemas has clinical relevance to anxiety
disorders. Emotional information is processed in a biased fashion among
individuals with anxiety disorders (Williams et al., 1997). Past negative
events can lead one to develop maladaptive schemas that can lead an
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individual to become anxious when confronted with specific situations.
Anxious individuals are especially attentive to environmental stimuli that are
related to threat or perceived threat. Thus, anxious individuals are likely to
perceive threatening meaning in ambiguous situations (Mathews & MacLeod,
1994) and develop biased schemas (Williams et al., 1997).
Take the example of a woman who is prone to anxiety and had a
negative testing experience. Perhaps she forgot about an important exam
and consequently did not adequately prepare. Initially, she would have the
unexpected sensation of physiological distress and emotional concerns
regarding failure. During the course of the exam, she becomes increasingly
worrisome, self-critical, and hopeless. Accompanying these emotional
experiences, the individual may also experience increased somatic symptoms
including sweating, heart palpitations, and shortness of breath. Despite the
fact that she did not adequately prepare for the exam, she incorporates these
negative experiences into her schema. With the anticipation of future exams,
she recalls this biased material that includes negative emotional experiences
and physiological arousal rather than a typical schema experienced when she
studied for her exam and was successful.
Schemas are automatic and related to biased information. According
to Williams et al. (1997), anxious individuals develop schemas that arise from
automatic processes, which “operate without awareness, are rapid,
unconstrained by capacity and occur in parallel” (p. 277). In an investigation
of how anxiety affects resource allocation, Williams and Dritschel (1988)
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demonstrated that cognitive resources are oriented either away or toward a
threatening stimulus. Non-anxious individuals shift their cognitive resources
away from threat while anxious individuals shift their cognitive resources
towards the threat.
Attentional Bias
According to Eysenck (1992), the visual environment is full of attributes
that vary in color, shape, size, movement, and have specific emotional
significance. Thus, specific attentional resources are necessary for selecting
important sensory information in one’s environment in an efficient manner.
Environmental stimuli with threat significance (e.g., sudden loud noises,
sudden movement) would quickly grab the attention of an individual. From an
evolutionary adaptive perspective, being sensitive to threats is necessary for
survival in that one needs to avoid danger whenever possible. It is suggested
that individuals with anxiety disorders demonstrate a disproportional amount
of their attentional resources toward threatening stimuli within their
environment (Eysenck, 1992). Attentional bias is described as the process of
selectively attending to threatening stimuli over neutral stimuli (Eysenck,
1992; Schutz et al., 2002). Individuals with anxiety disorders are likely to
misinterpret even harmless environmental stimuli or neutral situations as
being potentially dangerous. As a result, they may demonstrate an emotional
response characterized by physiological arousal that leads to behavioral
avoidance. Thus, individuals with anxiety disorders may be constantly
scanning the environment for possible signs of danger and are more likely to
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interpret ambiguous information as being more threatening or dangerous
compared to non-anxious individuals (Eysenck, 1992). What may be
interpreted by anxious individuals as potentially threatening easily and quickly
grabs their attention compared to non-anxious individuals. Eysenck (1992)
hypothesized that anxious individuals have a hypervigilant fear detection
mechanism. That is to say, these individuals have an internal alarm system
that is hypersensitive to stimuli that, in turn, are then interpreted (or
misinterpreted) as being potentially harmful. Researchers have tested
attentional bias using attentional dot-probe tasks, modified attentional dotprobe tasks with fear relevant pictures, and Stroop color-naming tasks.
Attentional dot-probe task. A number of studies have investigated
attentional bias among anxiety disorders. Many studies focused on the
investigation of task performance that is relevant to the presentation of
threatening versus non-threatening stimuli (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata,
1986). Among anxious individuals, a “shifting” of attention might occur toward
threatening stimuli, thus facilitating task performance when threatening stimuli
are presented (e.g., shorter response time when threatening words are
presented). This idea was tested using a dot-probe task. Typically, a dotprobe task involves participants’ responding (e.g., pressing a button) to the
appearance of a dot on a computer screen after viewing words presented to
them. The words themselves are characteristically either neutral (e.g.,
“flower”, “grass”) or potentially threatening (e.g., “snake”, “spider”; Barlow,
2001).
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In the attentional dot-probe task (or attentional deployment task;
Macleod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986), a word pair appears on a computer screen
in a series of trials. One word is above and the other is below the center of
the screen. The words are presented for brief intervals (e.g., 500 ms). In the
experimental trials, one word is threatening and the other word is neutral. In
other trials, both words are neutral. Participants are asked to read the top
word out loud on each trial. On key trials, a “dot probe” replaces one of the
two words, and participants press a button as soon as they see a probe. The
reaction time to the dot probe is a measure of visual attention to the word that
the dot replaced. Anxious participants respond faster to probes that replace
threat words; that is, they have an attentional bias for threat (Taghavi,
Neshat-Doost, Moradi, Yule, Dalgleish, 1999).
Asmundson and Stein (1994) investigated participants diagnosed with
social phobia and compared them to a control group of individuals not
meeting criteria for social phobia. Participants with social phobia had
significantly quicker response times to probes (e.g., dots) following social
threat words compared to probes following either neutral or physical threat
words. Control participants did not exhibit this effect. The researchers
suggested that participants with social phobia selectively process threat cues
that are specifically related to social evaluation.
Navon and Margalit (1983) found that anxious participants were no
more sensitive to threatening material than control participants. However,
they did find a different pattern of response depending upon whether the
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threatening word was shown at the top of the screen or at the bottom of the
screen, and if the probe replaced the top word or the bottom word. For
example, if the word was threatening and replaced by a probe at the top of
the screen, then anxious participants were quicker to respond than controls.
Anxious participants were slower to respond if the word was neutral and
replaced by a probe at the top compared to controls. They were also slower
to respond if the word at the bottom of the screen was threatening and
replaced by a probe at the top compared to controls. Furthermore, anxious
participants demonstrated a slower response time if a threat word was at the
top of the screen and was replaced by a probe at the bottom of the screen.
These results suggest that anxious individuals orient their attention toward the
location where the threat occurred. The controls had a tendency to
demonstrate just the opposite, suggesting that they orient their attention away
from the location where the threat occurred (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, &
Mathews, 1997).
Using an attentional dot-probe task, MacLeod and Matthews (1988)
investigated the vulnerability factor of trait anxiety when state anxiety is high.
They examined medical students prior to an important exam. The students
were administered the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 1983) 12
weeks prior to an exam and one week prior to an exam. The students were
assessed and classified as being high or low trait-anxious and high or low
state-anxious. The participants completed a dot-probe task 12 weeks prior to
an exam and then again one week prior to an exam. There were no
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significant differences between high trait-anxious and low trait-anxious
participants when the attentional dot-probe task that was administered 12
weeks prior to the exam. However, one week prior to the exam participants
high in trait anxiety showed bias towards words that were related to exams.
That is, they responded quicker when the probe replaced an exam word in
the same location. This was the opposite for participants low in trait anxiety in
that they responded slower to exam words when a probe in the same location
replaced it. These results suggest that trait anxiety is a vulnerability factor,
although it is apparent in individual differences in attentional bias only when
state anxiety is high such as prior to an important exam (Williams et al.,
1997).
Modified use of attentional dot-probe tasks with pictures of feared
stimuli. The words themselves may not create a significant amount of stress
when a dot-probe task is used. Hansen and Hansen (1988) therefore used a
modification of the attentional dot-probe task containing depictions of facial
expressions (e.g., neutral, happy, angry) rather than words. Although control
group individuals detected angry facial expressions among a crowd more
readily than happy faces among the same crowd, the anxious individuals
detected angry facial expressions significantly faster. The researchers
suggest that threatening faces tend to “pop out” of a crowd, supporting the
attentional bias hypothesis. Ohman, Flykt, and Esteves (2001) suggested
small animal stimuli could capture the attention of anxious individuals faster
than non-anxious individuals, similar to the methods of detecting faces. They
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exposed participants to fear relevant stimuli (e.g., spiders, snakes) and
neutral stimuli (e.g., flowers, mushrooms). In a series of experiments,
participants detected the snakes and spiders significantly faster than the
flowers and mushrooms. The ability to detect the location of the spider or
snake quickly was shown regardless of the location within an array of
distracting stimuli (e.g., bushes, birds), suggesting that they “popped out”
rather than requiring the participants to actively search for them.
Furthermore, participants who indicated that they had a phobia of snakes or
spiders detected these stimuli faster than the participants who did not. The
findings suggest that individuals in general have the ability to direct their
attention toward potentially threatening or dangerous stimuli (e.g., spiders,
snakes). The detection process was accomplished in an efficient and
effortless manner. The individuals who are anxious (e.g., phobic) appear to
have a heightened ability to focus attention on feared stimuli. The
researchers suggest this selective attention is what has helped individuals to
survive by avoiding danger.
Stroop color-naming task. A popular approach to investigating
attentional bias uses an interference paradigm, namely the Stroop colornaming task (Stroop, 1935). Stroop tasks have been used quite frequently to
investigate attentional processes. In the original Stroop task, participants
were shown a series of words naming actual colors (e.g., green, red, brown)
or ambiguous stimuli (e.g., rows of Xs) each of which were printed in different
colors. The words themselves did not always match the color in which they
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were printed (e.g., the word “red” might appear in green ink). The participant
was required to identify the color printed while ignoring the meaning of the
word. Participants had longer response times to identify the colors of words
when the words were antagonistic to the color (e.g., the word “red” printed in
green ink) as opposed to rows of meaningless stimuli (e.g., rows of Xs printed
in various colors), or to words printed with its corresponding color (e.g., the
word “green” printed in green ink; Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996).
The interference of one attention-requiring stimulus with another in a selective
attention task may be measured as a function of reaction time. People are
slower to respond in the Stroop color-naming task when the color name is
different from the ink color, suggesting that attentional resources have been
devoted to the meaning of the word, interfering with ability to name the ink
color (Posner & Snyder, 1975). Generally, reaction time will be shorter when
the participant is not paying attention to the task-irrelevant dimensions of the
stimuli on interference tasks.
Modified versions of the Stroop color-naming task were used with
increased interest in cognitive processes associated with emotional
disturbance. Anxious participants also show an attentional bias for threat on
the modified Stroop color-naming task. The Stroop color-naming task can be
used to measure the significance on emotional salience of words (Williams et
al., 1986). For instance, Gotlib and McCann (1984) used the Stroop colornaming task to examine the latency effect of naming colors among students
with mild depression. The students were required to identify the colors of
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words that were classified as neutral (e.g., lighted, cake, beads),
negative/depressive (e.g., hopeless, tormented, grief), or positive in nature
(e.g., applause, happy, smile). Students who were not depressed showed
very little variation in response time between each of the categories of words.
However, the students who were depressed had significantly slower reaction
times when identifying the colors of the negative words compared to the
neutral or positive words.
Mathews and MacLeod (1985) found similar results among participants
diagnosed with anxiety. Participants were divided into two groups that were
based upon their anxiety being either social in nature (e.g., uncomfortable in
evaluative situations) or physical in nature (e.g., having a panic attack that
would lead to a heart attack). Participants were asked to identify the color of
words that were classified as neutral (e.g., holiday), socially threatening (e.g.,
failure), or physically threatening (e.g., disease). Participants with anxiety
had slower response times for identifying threatening words compared to
neutral words. All participants with anxiety had slower response times for
words containing a social threat. However, only those participants with
anxiety that was physical in nature had slower response times for identifying
words that were physically threatening. The control participants had nonsignificant differences in response times between the categories of words that
were neutral, socially threatening, and physically threatening. The results
suggested that individuals with anxiety disorders tend to exhibit attentional
bias for threatening stimuli and would thus have longer response times when
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asked to identify threatening words compared to when asked to identify
neutral words.
Watts, McKenna, Sharrock, and Trezise (1986) investigated
participants that were classified as spider-avoidant. The researchers used
the Stroop color-naming task containing words classified as threatening (e.g.,
death, fear) and also words specific to spider-related pathology (e.g., crawl,
hairy). The results demonstrated that the spider-avoidant participants did not
significantly differ in their response times when asked to identify the color of
general-threatening words compared to non-spider-avoidant participants.
However, the spider-avoidant participants did demonstrate significantly slower
response times when asked to identify the color of words containing a spider
related threat. The results suggest that among the spider-avoidant
participants, attention is drawn to the actual meaning of the word that
distracted them from the task at hand (e.g., identifying the color), resulting in
slowed reaction times.
Attentional Bias Relevant to Test Anxiety
Test-irrelevant cognitive processing accounts for the relationship
between elevated anxiety and performance deficits among students (Muller,
1992). Elevated anxiety induces attentional deficits that lead high testanxious students to direct their attention toward task-irrelevant concerns (e.g.,
“I wonder how everyone else is doing”) and away from task-relevant concerns
(e.g., the exam; Muller, 1992; Zeidner, 1980). Cognitive interference has two
distinct components. The first consists of self-interference and preoccupation
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that involve cognitive appraisals and worry about one’s performance (e.g.,
“the stress is too much!”). The second component is distractibility (e.g.,
difficulty focusing on the task at hand). In an exam situation, intrusive
thoughts and distractibility often lead to self-defeat and may impair
performance if the student does not believe that she or he can cope
effectively (Sarason & Sarason, 1990).
Early research investigating attentional processing focused primarily
on the mechanisms involving distractibility. Highly anxious children direct
their attention more toward task-irrelevant and less toward task-relevant
information (Dusek, 1980). For instance, Nottelmann and Hill (1977)
investigated task-irrelevant behavior among fourth and fifth grade children.
The children were assessed and classified as low-anxious, moderatelyanxious, or highly-anxious. The children were instructed to perform anagram
tasks (e.g., writing as many words possible from the word “generation”).
While the children were performing the anagram tasks, an experimenter
performed a different anagram task (e.g., generating words from the word
“inoperable”) as a method to assess the frequency and direction of taskirrelevant behaviors. Task-irrelevant behaviors were recorded as glances at
the experimenter and what they were doing, glances directly at the
experimenter’s task, and other off-task glances. High-anxious children
created fewer words and glanced away more frequently compared to the lowanxious children.
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Hypotheses of distractibility suggest that cognitive interference plays a
key role showing a tendency to experience thoughts that intrude or “pop into”
a student’s mind while taking a test. When students are confronted with a
challenging task, they are prone to cognitive interference that divides their
attention between self and the exam (Sarason, 1987). In general, testanxious students spend approximately 40% of their available time on taskirrelevant cognitive activities (e.g., worry, wandering of thoughts), and only
60% on task-relevant activities (e.g., analyzing questions; Deffenbacher,
1978). It is postulated that when conceptualizing cognitive interference,
divergence of attention is prompted by environmental stimuli that are
considered to be potential threats (Eysenck, 1992).
Alting and Markham (1993) examined the distractibility of children
under the hypothesis that participants might be searching the environment for
stimuli indicating threat, thus would be selectively biased toward threatening
cues. Participants were administered Sarason’s (1984) Reactions to Tests
and evaluated as either low test-anxious or high test-anxious. They were
then instructed to perform 20 difficult anagram tasks (target task). The
participants were then divided into two groups. One group was given specific
instructions stating that their performance would be related to their
intelligence (i.e., the experimental group). The other group was given no
such instruction (i.e., the control group). The distracters consisted of
nonverbal visual images that were rated as emotionally neutral.
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Alting and Markham (1993) observed that high test-anxious
participants demonstrated significantly longer duration times glancing away
from the target task, compared to low test-anxious participants. However, the
frequency of glancing away from the target task was not significantly different
between low and high test-anxious participants. In general, when comparing
all participants, it was found that among the participants who were given the
indication of the relationship between performance and intelligence, the high
test-anxious group demonstrated longer duration of glancing away from the
target task compared to the low test-anxious participants. However, no
significant differences were found between the high test-anxious experimental
and the high test-anxious control groups.
These results support the hypothesis that distractibility to taskirrelevant non-threatening cues provides evidence of cognitive interference
with high test-anxious students. However, the lack of significance between
the control and experimental high test-anxious groups could be due to the
neutral nature of the stimuli. Therefore, examining high test-anxious students
with threat stimuli may support the hypothesis of these students being
selectively biased toward threatening cues.
Similar to individuals with depression and anxiety disorders, testanxious students may have a tendency to use a disproportionate amount of
their cognitive resources scanning the test environment for possible signs of
threat due to the way in which they process information that will prepare them
for potential failure (Eysenck, 1992). In other words, they may frequently
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interpret ambiguous stimuli in a threatening fashion. Thus, high test-anxious
students might have an attentional bias for threatening stimuli in the testrelated environment. As a result, students with test anxiety interpret the testrelated environment differently from students who do not experience test
anxiety. Students with test anxiety may recognize environmental stimuli and
deem them important, while these stimuli may remain unrecognized by
students without test anxiety (Schutz et al., 2002).
Keogh and French (2001) investigated the susceptibility to distraction
among high test-anxious participants. Participants were administered the
State Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 1983) and were classified as low
test-anxious or high test-anxious according to their scores on the Test Anxiety
Scale (Sarason, 1978). Participants were administered a computerized task
and instructed to identify whether a word appearing on a screen was either
“left” or “right”. In the control condition, a target word replaced a “cross”
symbol on the computer screen. In the experimental condition, a distractor
word was replaced by the target word. The distractors present were
classified as exam threatening words (e.g., examination); general-threatening
words (e.g., dangerous); exam non-threatening words (e.g., intelligent);
general non-threatening words (e.g., lettuce); uncategorized neutral words
(e.g., advertise); and non-word controls (e.g., XXX). Participants were
randomly allocated to a stress or non-stress conditions. Participants in the
stress condition were asked to count backwards from 1000 out loud in threes
for two minutes (e.g., 1000, 997, 994, etc). These participants were informed
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that the ability to successfully complete this task was related to intelligence.
Participants in the non-stress condition only completed the computer task.
High test-anxious participants (compared to low test-anxious
participants) exhibited increased susceptibility to distraction only when
receiving an anxiety-provoking stressor. When high test-anxious participants
were placed in low stress conditions, there were no significant differences in
distractibility. There were no significant differences between high and low
test-anxious participants when exam non-threatening words (e.g.,
intelligence) were presented. Keogh and French (2001) believed that
susceptibility to distraction exhibited by high test-anxious participants would
be most pronounced with exam threatening words. That is, high test-anxious
participants would be most distracted by examination-relevant threatening
stimuli (e.g., examination). However, among high test-anxious participants,
susceptibility was significantly different compared to low test-anxious
participants when shown general-threatening words, not exam threatening
words. According to Keogh and French (2001) these findings suggest that
test-anxious students are more affected by the emotional valence of the
words rather than the relevance of material. This study indicates that high
test-anxious students who are susceptible to examination stress are more
likely to be distracted by threat stimuli and are likely to attend selectively to
worrisome thoughts and negative cognitive appraisals; however, relevance of
examination threat may not be as important as stimuli containing emotional
threat (Keogh & French, 2001).
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These results indicate that susceptibility to distraction was directly
related to examination relevant stimuli (e.g., exam threat words), and could be
due in part to the interpretation of the words themselves. It is possible that
the threat-relevant stimulus words failed to provoke the desired effect due to
an inadequate repertoire of words. Thus, threat-relevant words may be
directly related to the schema of examination stress. For example, the threatrelevant words consisted of “examination,” “grade,” and “multiple-choice.”
Perhaps words that are more threat-relevant, such as “quiz,” “fail,” and
“algebra” may be more related to test-anxious students’ schema. An
investigation with respect to emotional valence of these words would help to
shed some light on this matter.
The finding that susceptibility to distraction was not directly related to
threat-relevant stimuli is also inconsistent with many studies that have
demonstrated that the relevance of distracting stimuli is important among
anxious participants. For instance, Mathews and Klug (1993) found that highanxious participants showed a greater interference to cognitive concern for
threat-relevant words compared to threat words that were irrelevant using a
Stroop color-naming task (Keogh & French, 2001). Perhaps a follow-up study
using the Stroop color-naming task should be used to investigate test-anxious
students to support the attentional bias hypothesis and the relationship
between threat-relevant stimuli that is specific to test-anxious participants’
schema.
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The Stroop color-naming task has yielded promising results and has
been used to investigate depression, general anxiety, specific phobia, and
social phobia. With respect to social phobia, Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, and
Dombeck (1990) used a Stroop color-naming task to investigate cognitive
processing of participants with social phobia. They investigated color-naming
latencies for words that contained social threat. The researchers selected
participants who were diagnosed with social phobia and panic disorder
according to Anxiety Disorders Interview Scale – Revised (ADIS-R; DiNardo
& Barlow, 1988). The participants were presented with words that
represented social threat (e.g., embarrassment) or physical threat (e.g.,
illness). Both the social threat and physical threat words were matched with a
control list of words containing neutral words (e.g., upward) according to
number of letters, syllables, and frequency of occurrence. Participants were
presented with the words and then asked to identify the color of the words,
while specifically instructed to ignore the meaning of those words.
The results demonstrated that individuals with social phobia had a
longer response time for color-naming the words representing social threat
compared to neutral words. Individuals with panic disorder had a longer
response time for color-naming the words representing physical threat
compared to neutral words. This study demonstrated that both individuals
with social phobia and those with panic disorder demonstrated greater
cognitive processing of words related to their cognitive schemas (e.g., their
mental representations of experience that include a particular way of
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perceiving cognitively and responding to a complex situation or set of stimuli;
Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). Both individuals with social phobia
and those with anxiety disorders had specific schemas facilitating cognitive
processing and concerns. In other words, individuals with social phobia are
concerned with social-evaluative threats, and individuals with panic disorder
are concerned with physical threats (Hope et al., 1990).
The theory of attentional bias as it relates to hypervigilance suggests
that test anxiety is associated with distractibility due to the divergence of
attention from the examination itself to threatening stimuli within the
environment (Eysenck, 1992; Hope et al., 1990). Because test-anxious
students are thought to be constantly scanning the test environment to detect
stimuli of potential threat, a disproportionate allocation of cognitive resources
by abandoning test-taking cognitive resources that ultimately leads to a
disruption in performance. Since high test-anxious students demonstrate
attentional bias and are preoccupied with intrusive thoughts (as demonstrated
with the transactional processing model, Spielberger & Vagg, 1995) it is not
surprising that they may have difficulty focusing on test-taking (Zeidner,
1998).
Although the literature supports the hypothesis of attentional bias and
cognitive interference among highly anxious individuals (e.g., social phobia,
specific phobia), thus far there have been no studies that have used the
Stroop color-naming task to examine the hypervigilance among test-anxious
students. Even though Keogh and French (2001) did not find hypervigilance
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among test-anxious students, it might be possible to investigate test anxiety
as it relates to a stressful environment (e.g., during or prior to an
examination). It may not be enough to elicit a hypervigilant response with
test-threat stimuli alone; therefore, attentional bias should be investigated
among test-anxious students during a stressful situation. For example, Alting
and Markhan (1998) told participants that successful completion of an
anagram task was related to their IQ. They hypothesized that this method of
stress induction would result in high test-anxious participants being more
distracted (see above).
Although no significant results were found between the stress induced
and non-stress induced groups, according to Alting and Markhan (1998), high
test-anxious participants demonstrated more distractibility (e.g., looking away
at task, looking at what experimenter was doing) compared to low testanxious participants. The lack of significance between the stress induction
groups may be due to the actual method of the stress induction. It is likely
that informing participants that their performance was related to their IQ did
not induce enough stress to cause an effect. Since the stress itself was not
directly measured as to its effectiveness, it is not actually known if stress
induction was successful or not. A more overt method could be used to
induce stress among participants. An example could be to inform the
participants that they would be given a test or are to perform a difficult task at
the end of the experiment. The success of the stress induction could then be
evaluated using the State Trait Anxiety Inventory, State scale (Spielberger,
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1983; similar to Amir, McNally, Riemann, Burns, Lorenz, & Mullen, 1996) and
the Multiple Affect Adjective Check List (Zuckerman, & Lubin, 1985).
An elevation in state anxiety was necessary to reveal significant
differences on the dot-probe task (MacLeod & Mathews, 1988). It would
appear that similar stress induction that is relevant to the testing situation
would be necessary to activate a high test-anxious individual’s test-related
schema. The schema of high test-anxious individuals is not activated unless
they are in a testing situation. Therefore, it would seem that merely
presenting test-threat words would not prompt significant elevations in state
anxiety to demonstrate a biased effect (e.g., slower response times on the
Stroop color-naming task). Thus, an appropriate amount of stress is
necessary to capture the testing situation, for instance, assessing the
participants just prior to an important exam.
In support of attentional bias for test anxiety, other cognitive tests
investigating test anxiety would be appropriate such as the attentional dot
probe task. With the attentional dot probe task, the focus will not necessarily
be on response time differences between threat and non-threat stimuli, but
rather the allocation of attentional resources that orient toward the location of
threat words. Anxious individuals, however, may respond to probes that
replace threat words more quickly than neutral words, suggesting that they
have an attentional bias for threat (Taghavi et al., 1999). Of particular
interest, however, is the finding that high trait-anxious individuals are more
likely to respond to stress with attentional changes around the subject of their
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predominant worry (Williams et al., 1997). As of now, there has been no
examination of test anxiety using the attentional dot probe task. Although
MacLeod and Mathews (1988) investigated a testing situation using medical
students (see above), the participants were not assessed for test anxiety.
Overview and Hypotheses
The present study examined attentional bias among students with test
anxiety. It is suggested that individuals who are highly test-anxious have a
tendency to focus on environmental cues or threat stimuli relevant to their
test-related schema (Williams et al., 1997). This idea was formally tested by
implementing a modified Stroop color-naming task and an attentional dotprobe task. The rationale for using these tasks is that attentional bias toward
threatening stimuli would be indicated by delayed color-naming responses
(Stroop task) and accelerated responses to probes replacing threatening
words (attentional dot-probe task). However, since the literature is
inconsistent regarding hypervigilance to test-threat stimuli among test-anxious
participants when using a Stroop color-naming task, some participants were
assessed just prior to an exam in order to effectively capture and assess test
anxiety during elevations of state anxiety. All participants were identified as
either high or low in test anxiety and assessed for state and trait anxiety and
test anxiety. They were randomly allocated to test (exam stress) or no test
(no exam stress) conditions.
Hypothesis one. Test-anxious students are thought to scan the
environment for potential threat and use a disproportionate amount of their
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cognitive resources searching for threatening stimuli. Thus, on the modified
Stroop color-naming task, high test-anxious participants (compared to low
test-anxious participants) were hypothesized to demonstrate significantly
slower response times for test-threat words, using a between groups
comparison. For example, the word “test”, a test-threat word, should yield a
slower response time among high test-anxious participants compared to low
test-anxious participants.
Hypothesis two, On the modified Stroop color-naming task, using a
two-way interaction in a between- and within-subjects design, high testanxious participants responding to test-threat words (1) will show slower
response times than when they are presented with test-threat control words,
and (2) will show slower response times than low test-anxious participants
responding to test-threat and test-threat control words. For instance, among
high test-anxious participants only, the word “exam”, a test-threat word,
should yield a slower response time compared to the word “water”, a testthreat control word.
Hypothesis three. According to attentional bias theory, test-anxious
individuals are sensitive to environmental stimuli that are relevant to their
specific anxiety-related schemas. Therefore, it was predicted that high testanxious participants will have significantly slower response times on the
Stroop task for threat words that are relevant to their specific anxiety-related
schemas. That is, high test-anxious participants should have slower
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response times for test-threat words (e.g., “time”) compared to general-threat
words (e.g., “rape”).
Hypothesis four. Using the attentional dot-probe task, response times
were hypothesized to be faster or slower with respect to the location of the
word and the probe. High test-anxious participants’ attention should be
oriented towards the location and direction of threat words that are relevant to
the participants’ particular schema. For example, response time will be faster
for high test-anxious participants (compared to low test-anxious participants)
if the probe replaces a test-threat word (e.g., “quiz”) when paired with a testthreat control word (e.g., “tree”) or a general-threat word (e.g., “drown”).
Similarly, high test-anxious participants (compared to low test-anxious
participants) were predicted to have slower response time if the probe
replaces a test-threat control word (e.g., “speakers”) when paired with a testthreat word (e.g., “studying”; see Figure 1). The rationale behind the dotprobe task is that high test-anxious participants will focus their attention on
test-threatening words. Thus if the probe occurs elsewhere (e.g., replacing a
neutral word), there will be a lag in response time because they have to shift
their focus away from the area of the test-threatening word.
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Figure 1. Attentional Dot-Probe Presentation
Faster response times among high test-anxious participants compared
To low test-anxious participants on these examples

QUIZ

+

TREE

FINAL

PHONE
ERROR

+

DROWN

+

TROUBLE
FAILURE

+

Slower response times among high test-anxious participants compared
To low test-anxious participants on these examples
SPEAKERS

+

RAYON

STUDYING

SICK
PASS

WRONG

+

+

GRADES
JITTERS

+

Hypothesis five, exploratory hypothesis. An elevation in state anxiety
was predicted to be necessary to activate test-related schemas. Hypotheses
one through four predicted differences between high test-anxious and low
test-anxious participants, without specifically examining elevations in state
anxiety. If an elevation in state anxiety is necessary to activate test-related
differences, it is unlikely that hypotheses one through four will reveal
significant differences in response latencies on both the modified Stroop
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color-naming task and the attentional dot-probe task. If one is about to take
an exam, state anxiety should be elevated. Thus, on the modified Stroop
color-naming task, high test-anxious participants who are under exam stress
should yield significantly slower response times compared to high testanxious participants who are not under exam stress (as described in
hypothesis one, two, and three). On the attentional dot-probe task, high testanxious participants who are under exam stress should yield significantly
faster response times (as described in hypothesis four) compared to high
test-anxious participants who are not under exam stress.
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Chapter 2.
METHOD
Participants
Participants were undergraduate psychology students attending the
University of Maine. All qualified participants were not colorblind and not
taking psychotropic medications. Participants were screened for test anxiety
and recruited voluntarily. In exchange for their participation, they were given
extra credit in their enrolled psychology course. Those meeting initial criteria
were asked to participate in the experimental portion of the study later in the
semester.
Based on an average effect size of d = 1.10 (derived from Alting &
Markham, 1993; Hope et al., 1990; Keogh & French, 2000; MacLeod &
Mathews, 1998) a sample size analysis with a statistical power of 0.80
demonstrated that a minimum of 56 participants (four groups of 14) would be
required to detect existing significant differences. The analysis assumed a
two-tailed hypothesis test (a = 0.05).
Assessment
Demographic information. Participants were asked general
demographic information (e.g., age, gender) and current GPA. In addition,
they were asked if they had been diagnosed with colorblindness, and whether
they were currently taking any psychotropic medication (i.e., the exclusionary
criteria). Participants were also instructed to complete a contact sheet with
their name and email address for the purpose of recruitment in the
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experimental portion of the study. This form was kept separate from all other
assessment materials and was treated as confidential (see Appendix A).
Reactions to Tests 20-item Scale (RTT 20-item Scale; Benson &
Bandalos, 1992). The RTT is representative of test anxiety due to its
multidimensional features that extend beyond the original worry and
emotionality components of test anxiety. The RTT was originally developed
as a 40-item self-report measure of test anxiety consisting of four subscales:
tension, worry, test-irrelevant thinking, and bodily symptoms (Sarason, 1984).
Benson and Bandalos (1992) developed a shorter 20-item scale revision of
the RTT consisting of the same subscales. Items on the 20-item scale
require respondents to evaluate the degree of various self-statements related
to the four subscales of test anxiety (e.g., tension: “I feel distressed and
worried before a test”; worry: “During a difficult tests, I worry whether I will
pass it”; test-irrelevant thinking: “During tests I find myself thinking of things
unrelated to the material being tested”; bodily symptoms: “I get a headache
before a test”). Items are rated based upon a 4-point Likert scale (1 = “Not at
all typical of me”, 2 = ”Only somewhat typical of me”, 3 = “Quite typical of me”,
and 4 = “Very typical of me”). Possible RTT scores range from 20 to 80 with
80 representing most extreme test anxiety.
Sarason (1984) demonstrated adequate correlation coefficients
between RTT 40-item scale and other measures, such as the Test Anxiety
Scale (r = 0.44 males, r = 0.38 females; Sarason, 1978) and the Cognitive
Interference Questionnaire (r = 0.47 males, r = 0.44 females; Yates, Hannell,
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& Lippett, 1985). According to Benson and Bandalos (1992), the RTT 20-item
scale correlated highly with its original 40-item scale (CFI = r = 0.86 – 0.99).
The RTT is a reliable measure of test anxiety with internal consistency
reliability coefficients ranging from r = 0.64 to r = 0.92. Present findings show
coefficient alpha r = 0.97.
The RTT 20-item scale was used in the present study as a measure of
participants’ indication of the presence of endorsed test anxiety. The RTT 20item scale was expected to correlate with the interference of test-threat words
on the modified Stroop color-naming task and response latency during the
attentional dot probe task (see Appendix B).
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 1983). The STAI is a
self-report measure of two separate dimensions of anxiety: state anxiety and
trait anxiety. State anxiety reflects changing emotional states of an individual
characterized by subjective feelings of tension, nervousness, apprehension,
and physiological arousal. Also, state anxiety can vary in intensity and is
thought to fluctuate over time. Trait anxiety, on the other hand, is
representative of stable personality characteristics and individual differences
in anxiety proneness. Trait anxiety is hypothesized to be a tendency to
respond with anxiety (e.g., state anxiety) based upon perceived threats within
the environment. Each subscale requires respondents to rate the degree of
various self-statements. State anxiety assesses how a respondent feels at
the present moment in time (e.g., “I feel calm”, “I feel frightened”) based upon
a 4-point Likert scale (1 = “Not at all”, 2 = “Somewhat”, 3 = “Moderately so”, 4
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= “Very much so”). Trait anxiety assesses how a respondent generally feels
(e.g., “I am a steady person”, “I lack self-confidence”) based upon a 4-point
Likert scale (1 = “Almost never”, 2 = “Sometimes”, 3 = “Often”, 4 = “Almost
always”).
The STAI scale has test-retest reliability with high school and college
student samples. For the Trait anxiety scale, the internal consistency
reliability coefficients ranged from r = 0.65 to r = 0.86 (present findings show
coefficient alpha r = 0.84). However, for the State anxiety scale, the internal
consistency reliability coefficients ranged from r = 0.16 to r = 0.62 (present
findings show coefficient alpha r = 0.51 for pretest and r = 0.59 for posttest).
The low level of stability may be due to situational influences existing at the
time of testing. Since State anxiety is expected to fluctuate and be reflective
of situational factors, the low reliability was expected. The STAI Trait anxiety
scale is a valid measure of anxiety and is correlated with other measures of
anxiety including the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale (r = 0.80), the IPAT
Anxiety Scale (r = 0.75) and the Multiple Affective Check List (r = 0.52)
The STAI was used in the present study as a measure of both state
and trait anxiety. The STAI Trait was used to investigate its relationship with
the RTT. The STAI State scale was used to assess the level of stress that
was present prior to an exam and to determine whether anxiety was
successfully increased prior to an exam. The STAI State was expected to
correlate with interference of test-threat words on the modified Stroop color-
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naming task, with high scores on the State scale demonstrating greater
interference as measured by longer reaction times (see Appendix B).
The Multiple Affect Adjective Check List - Revised (MAACL – R;
Zuckerman & Lubin, 1985). The MAACL-R is a self-report measure
consisting of 132 adjectives that are listed alphabetically. The MAACL-R is
designed to measure primary dimensions of affect. There are two forms of
the MAACL-R; a Trait form, which asks participants to check words to
describe how they “generally” feel, and a State form that requests participants
to check words to describe how they feel “now-today”. Both State and Trait
forms use the same 132 adjectives. The MAACL-R consists of five
subscales: anxiety (e.g., “afraid”, “fearful”), depression (e.g., “alone”,
“destroyed”), hostility (e.g., “annoyed”, “complaining”), positive affect (e.g.,
“free”, “friendly”), and sensation seeking (e.g., “active”, aggressive”). The
MAACL-R also has two summary scales. The dysphoria summary scale
includes anxiety, depression, and hostility subscales. The positive affect and
sensation seeking summary scale includes positive affect and sensation
seeking subscales. The dysphoria summary scale was used in the present
study.
The MAACL-R has discriminant validity in which the measure is shown
to differentiate patients with mood disorders from those with other types of
disorders (Zuckerman & Lubin, 1985). Additionally, the MAACL-R has
demonstrated divergent validity between patients with mood disorders and
non-clinical samples. The MAACL-R correlates with other similar measures
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of anxiety, including the STAI (r = 0.52). Test-retest reliabilities ranged from r
= 0.61 to r = 0.87 and internal consistency reliability coefficients ranged from r
= 0.84 to r = 0.94 (Zuckerman & Lubin, 1985). Present findings show
coefficient alpha r = 0.83 at pretest and r = 0.91 at posttest.
The MAACL-R was used in the present study as a measure of state
anxiety. The MAACL-R State scale was used to assess the level of stress
induced and to determine whether anxiety was increased just prior to an
exam. The MAACL-R was expected to correlate with interference of testthreat words on the modified Stroop color-naming task, with high scores on
the State scale demonstrating greater interference (see Appendix B).
Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNE; Leary, 1983). The FNE is a
self-report measure of respondents’ beliefs that are hypothesized to be
indicative of social phobia. The original measure was a 30 item true-false
questionnaire (Watson & Friend, 1969). However, a new briefer form of the
FNE was developed by Leary (1983), which consists of 12 items. Each of the
12 items requires the respondent to rate the degree of various self-statements
that are related to social situations (e.g., “I worry about what others think of
me even when I know it doesn’t make any difference”, “I often worry that I will
say or do the wrong thing”). Respondents rate each of the 12 statements on
a 5-point Likert scale (e.g., 1 = “Not at all characteristic of me”, 2 = “Slightly
characteristic of me”, 3 = “Moderately characteristic of me”, 4 = “Very
characteristic of me”, 5 = “Extremely characteristic of me”). FNE scores
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range from 12 to 60 with 60 indicating the most severe social phobia (see
Appendix B).
The reliability of the briefer 12-item FNE has demonstrated that it
correlates strongly with the original 30-item scale (r = 0.96). Furthermore,
test-retest and inter-item reliabilities have demonstrated strong coefficient
alphas (r = 0.75, r = 0.96 respectively). Present findings show coefficient
alpha r = 0.88. The FNE is a valid measure of social anxiety as it correlates
with other assessments of social distress and avoidance (Friend & Gilbert,
1973; Smith & Sarason, 1975).
The FNE was used as a measure of social evaluation in the present
study for the purpose of distinguishing participants with social anxiety. Since
test-anxiety has a significant evaluative component, the FNE should correlate
with threat words that contain social significance (e.g., failure) and with the
RTT.
Modified Stroop Color-Naming Task. The Stroop color-naming task
was a modified version of the original Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) and adapted
from the one used by Hope et al. (1990). The words used included testthreat, general-threat, and control words. The modified Stroop color-naming
task was administered using E-Prime software program (Psychology Software
Tools, Inc., 2000). The program allows for the presentation of stimulus words
and the recording of response latencies.
Sixty different words were selected from a broader list of 250 words
presented in a pilot study that requested undergraduate participants to rate
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the words on a Likert scale (0 = “Not at all emotional” to 5 = “Extremely
emotional”). In addition, participants were asked to classify words.
Participants were asked how each word was related to anxiety or test anxiety.
Responses were also on a Likert scale (0 = “Not at all related” to 5 =
“Extremely related”). This broader list of words was compiled from various
anxiety and test anxiety questionnaires, previous modified Stroop colornaming tasks (Hope et al., 1990; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Keogh &
French, 2001), attentional dot probe tasks (MacLeod & Mathews, 1988), and
open-ended participant responses (similar to Maki, 2003; see Appendix C).
For the Stroop task, participants were instructed to name or identify the
color of a word (i.e., the word “Network” printed in Red ink) by pressing a
corresponding computer keyboard key. The modified Stroop color-naming
task was divided into three phases: two warm-up phases and one
experimental phase. At the beginning of each phase, the participants were
given simple instructions for the task presented visually on the computer
screen (e.g., “Your task is to identify the color of each word presented on the
screen. If the word is presented in the color RED, then press the RED button.
If the word is presented in the color GREEN, then press the GREEN button,”
etc.). Note that a keyboard was used as the color identifier instead of the
participant verbally identifying the color. Pilot data were examined to
determine, if indeed, a Stroop effect (i.e., interference) had appeared. Some
color-words corresponded to the actual colors, whereas others did not.
Results of the pilot data demonstrated that significantly longer response
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latencies occurred when the font color and the color named by the word did
not match (i.e., delayed response time identifying the font color blue when the
word printed was “RED” compared to more rapid response times identifying
font color red when the printed word was “RED”), F(1, 60) = 82.574, p < .001.
For the present study, participants were initially given a list of 20 words to
identify. The words in the first phase, ONE, TWO, THREE, and FOUR, were
presented individually on the computer screen in the colors red, blue, green,
and yellow. The purpose of the first phase was to screen for color blindness
and act as a warm-up. The second phase was similarly designed as a warmup phase, but this time for the purpose of further assessing the Stroop or
interference effect. The participants were shown 20 words naming colors
(i.e., RED, BLUE, GREEN, and YELLOW), presented in the colors red, blue,
green, and yellow (similar to the pilot study words).
The third phase of the modified Stroop color-naming task was the
experimental phase that consisted of the 60 words from the first pilot study
(see Table 1). The 60 words were divided into 4 categories: test-threat
words, test-threat control words (neutral words), general-threat words, and
general-threat control words (neutral words). Both test-threat control and
general-threat control were classified as neutral and matched with their
respective threat words according to the number of letters and frequency of
occurrence in the English language (Caroll, Davies, & Rachman, 1971). The
test-threat words were hypothesized to be representative of the concerns of
test-anxious students during testing situations (e.g., FAILURE, QUIZ).
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General-threat words were hypothesized to be representative of the concerns
of anxious individuals and how they perceive events in their environment
(e.g., AMBULANCE, FATAL). In the experimental phase, the 60 words (15
test-threat words, 15 test-threat control words, 15 general-threat words, and
15 general-threat control words) were presented in random order and
presented in the colors red, blue, green, and yellow.
Table 1. Stimuli for the Modified Stroop Color-Naming Task.
Font Color

Test-threat

Red
Blue
Green
Yellow
Red
Green
Blue
Yellow
Red
Blue
Green
Yellow
Red
Blue
Green

Challenge
Mind
Time
Test
Panic
Worry
Cramming
Confusion
Doubt
Exam
Frustration
Hurry
Incomplete
Incorrect
Performance

Test-threat
Control
Spaghetti
Tape
Soda
Shoe
Tulip
Table
Cucumbers
Pinecone
Water
Sock
Specialized
Radio
Taillights
Firelight
Associative

General-threat
Accident
Alone
Ambulance
Coffin
Crash
Deadly
Death
Abuse
Disease
Distress
Rape
Fatal
Fright
Illness
Insane

General-threat
Control
Calendar
Coast
Butterfly
Camera
Chair
Handle
Jeans
Elbow
Sticker
Elephant
Glue
Grass
Coffee
Dresser
Penny

In all three phases, the presented word remained on the computer
screen until the participant identified or named the color of the word by
pressing a colored button on the keyboard. The software recorded
correct/incorrect responses and response latencies of each word.
Attentional dot-probe task. The attentional-dot probe task was adapted
from the one used by MacLeod and Mathews (1988). As with the modified
Stroop color-naming task, the attentional dot-probe task was administered
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using E-Prime, a computer software program (Psychology Software Tools,
Inc., 2000).
The participants were instructed to respond when they saw a probe,
which was in the form of a large plus sign (+). The attentional dot probe task
was divided into two phases: one warm-up phase and one experimental
phase. At the beginning of each phase, the participants were given simple
instructions for the task presented visually on the computer screen (e.g.,
“Your task is to press the SPACE BAR when you see the + on the computer
screen”. The words in the first phase were ONE, TWO, THREE, and FOUR
that were presented in pairs, one displayed at the top of the screen and one
at the bottom of the screen. One word of each pair was replaced by a probe
(+). For example, at times the word at the top of the screen was replaced by
a probe, while at other times the word at the bottom of the screen was
replaced by a probe.
The second phase of the attentional dot probe task was the
experimental phase consisting of 60 similar, but different words selected from
the same pilot study (see Table 2). As with the warm-up phase, the word
pairs were presented randomly, one at the top of the screen and the other at
the bottom of the screen. The word pairs consisted of (1) one test-threat
word paired with one general-threat word, (2) one test-threat word paired with
one test-threat control word, or (3) one general-threat word paired with one
general-threat control word. One of the paired words was randomly replaced
by a probe, either at the top of the screen or at the bottom of the screen.
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During both phases of the attentional dot probe task, the presented probe
remained on the computer screen until the participant responded indicating
that they recognized the presence of the probe by pressing the SPACE BAR
on the keyboard. The software recorded correct/incorrect responses and
response latencies of each word.
Table 2. Stimuli for the Attentional Dot-Probe Task.
Test-threat
Evaluation
Final
Grades
Nervous
Pass
Tension
College
Failure
Essay
Mistake

Generalthreat
Discomfort
Drown
Jitters
Seizure
Sick
Spiders
Stroke
Trouble
Snake
Falling

Generalthreat
Murder
Pain
Scared
Kill
War
Cancer
Slaughter
Trapped
Suffocate
Poison

General-threat
Control
Pencil
Belt
Finger
Map
Pen
Candle
Triangles
Network
Marketing
Tissue

Test-Threat
Problems
Quiz
Remember
Studying
Wrong
Memorize
Intelligence
Stupid
Math
Error

Test-threat
Control
Eggplant
Tree
Blankets
Speakers
Rayon
Arkansas
Breadbaskets
Purely
Hull
Phone

Procedure
Participant selection. Participants were selected based upon
questionnaire responses (see below), contacted by email, and requested to
participate in the study. Participants who did not meet the criteria were
provided an explanation as to reason they would not be participating in the
study (e.g., We are seeking individuals without color blindness). Prescreening took place close to the beginning of the spring term in psychology
courses that were in the university’s web-based participant recruitment
system, Experimetrix. The experimental portion of the study took place later in
the semester.
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Each participant was given a brief explanation of the experiment,
informed of the anticipated time it would take to complete the experimental
tasks, and requested to read the consent form (copies of which were given to
the participants). The consent form explained that participants might become
anxious during the procedures, but that the procedures should be no more
stressful than typical encounters in daily life. However, if the participant
wished to terminate or withdraw their participation, they were free to do so at
any point during the procedures (see Appendix D).
Questionnaire assessment. Questionnaires were administered during
the pre-screening session. Upon reading the consent form, each participant
was given a series of questionnaires to complete that consisted of the
demographic information form, the RTT 20-item scale, the STAI (Trait and
State pretest), the MAACL-R pretest, and the 12-item FNE. The four
questionnaires were administered in random order. Participants were asked
to read the directions carefully and to take their time when completing each
questionnaire. Participants who met the criteria were then requested to
participate in the next phase of the study (the experimental portion) that
occurred later in the semester. At this time, they were administered the STAI
State posttest and MAACL-R posttest (see Appendix B). It should be clarified
that the STAI State pretest and MAACL-R pretest were both administered at
the beginning of the semester (e.g., the first week), at which time it was
assumed that no exams were taking place. These pre-measures were used
as a baseline. The STAI State posttest and the MAACL-R posttest were
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administered during the experimental portion of the study and administered
prior to the computer tasks and prior to any upcoming exams. Participants
who were requested to participate in the experimental portion agreed to take
part in the experiment at a time and place within two hours prior to the
scheduled exam. These post measures were used to examine if an elevation
in state anxiety took place for those who had exams immediately following the
experiment.
Computer tasks. Participants completed the computer tasks, the
modified Stroop color-naming task, and the attentional dot-probe task,
presented in counterbalanced order. Half of the participants completed the
attentional dot-probe task first and the modified Stroop color-naming task
second, and the other half completed the modified Stroop color-naming task
first and the attentional dot-probe task second.
Each participant was seated in front of a computer screen with an
accessible keyboard. The keyboard was modified to represent color-coded
response keys (i.e., the number pad had red, blue, green, and yellow stickers
covering the numbers 1, 3, 7, and 9 respectively) and a symbol-coded
response key (i.e., + covered the space bar key). The room itself was quiet
and dimly lit. Each participant was given brief verbal instructions and shown
how to use the color- and symbol-coded keyboard keys. They were then
asked to complete the first phase of the modified Stroop color-naming task or
the attentional dot-probe task. Upon completion of the first phase, they were
asked if they understood the procedure and whether they had any questions
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before proceeding to phases two and three of the Stroop color-naming task
and attentional dot-probe task.
Debriefing. All participants were thanked for their participation and
given written debriefing information following the experiment (similar to Maki,
2003) that contained a brief description of the study, expected results, and
contact information in the event they had any questions about the experiment
and outcome (see Appendix E).
Design and Analysis
Participants were divided into two independent groups according to
their test anxiety rating based upon their responses to the RTT 20-item scale:
the high test-anxious group and the low test-anxious group (“Group”).
Participants with scores falling at least one standard deviation above the
mean were classified as high test-anxious and participants with scores falling
at least one standard deviation below the mean were classified as low testanxious. Participants were also independently factored by “Condition”, in
which participants either had an upcoming exam immediately following the
computer tasks (within two hours), test condition, or no exam(s) scheduled for
at least four days following the computer tasks, no test condition. The
participants were pre-selected based upon their willingness to participate prior
to an upcoming exam.
Data were analyzed using a general linear model multi-variate analysis
(MANOVA) to examine differences between levels of the independent factors
of test anxiety (low test-anxious versus high test-anxious) for multiple
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dependent variables of response latencies for the Stroop color-naming task
and attentional dot-probe task. The analysis also included independent
factors for test versus no test conditions, and word-type, a within-subject
comparison (e.g., test-threat versus test-threat control and general-threat
versus general-threat control). Furthermore, a more specific analysis was
performed to examine response latencies among high test-anxious
participants in the test condition compared to low test-anxious participants in
the no test condition using a analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) holding Group
and Condition constant (the covariates). Dependent variables examined
included general-threat response latencies, general-threat control response
latencies, test-threat response latencies, and test-threat control response
latencies.
High test-anxious participants. Analyses compared latencies of testthreat words between low and high test-anxious participants using the data
collected from the modified Stroop color-naming task. Second, latencies of
test-threat words were compared to latencies of neutral words. Analyses
examined response latencies among high test-anxious versus low testanxious participants using the data collected from the attentional dot-probe
task. Response latencies were compared.
Anxiety-related schemas. Using the data collected from the Stroop
color-naming task, analyses examined high test-anxious participants and
compared latencies of general-threat words with test-threat words to
determine if slower response times were relative to the participants’ particular
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schemas, using an ANOVA with repeated measures. Further analyses
examined schemas by holding constant STAI Trait among highly anxious
participants.
Test condition. Data from both the modified Stroop color-naming task
and the attentional dot-probe task were used to compare response latencies
between participants in the test condition and those participants who were in
the no test condition. High test-anxious versus low test-anxious response
latencies were examined using MANOVA.
Elevation in state anxiety. To test whether state anxiety was elevated
prior to an exam, pre- and post-STAI-S and pre- and post-MAACL-R were
analyzed using an ANOVA with repeated measures.
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Chapter 3.
RESULTS
Participant Characteristics
Four hundred forty-four respondents (287 females, 157 males) were
assessed on the RTT as a pre-screening measure. The RTT sample mean
was 48.91 (SD = 11.43). Sixty-two participants (38 females, 24 males) were
recruited for the study proper, 31 with RTT scores equal to or higher than one
standard deviation above the mean (high test-anxious group), and 31 with
scores equal to or lower than one standard deviation below the mean (low
test-anxious group). Thirty-one participants were asked to take part in the
study just prior to an exam, the test condition. The remaining 31 participants
were asked to participate in the experiment when they had no exam, the no
test condition. The test and no test conditions each had equal numbers of
high and low test-anxious participants. Table 3 reports demographic and
summary statistics of the high and low test-anxious groups, and test and no
test conditions for age, gender, and GPA. There were no significant
differences in GPA for Group or Condition. Table 4 reports a summary of
participant total scores on anxiety measures administered. All measures
were significantly different between high test- and low test-anxious groups.
Between test and no test conditions, no difference was observed on any
anxiety measure with the exception of Post-STAI-S, F(1, 60) = 4.61, p =
<.036. There were no significant differences for gender on any of the
measures.
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Table 3. Participant Demographic Summary Statistics
Group
Low Test-Anxious

High Test-Anxious

Condition

Condition

Test

No Test

Test

No Test

N

15

16

16

15

Gender (M/F)

7/8

9/7

12/4

10/5

M (SD)

M (SD)

Age

20.7a (1.4)

24.3a (9.7)

20.2a (2.7)

19.8a (1.7)

GPA

3.2a (0.7)

3.0a (0.5)

2.8a (0.6)

3.0a (0.6)

Note. M/F: males/females, GPA: grade point average. Means having the same subscript are not
significantly different at the p < .05 level.

Table 4. Participant Anxiety Measure Summary Statistics
Group
Low Test-Anxious

High Test-Anxious

Condition
Test

No Test

Condition
Test

M(SD)

No Test

F (1, 60)

M(SD)

RTT

31.1a(4.5)

30.4a(5.6)

68.4b(6.6)

69.5b(6.5)

217.6**

STAI-T

40.7a(8.8)

35.1a(7.2)

60.2b(10.2)

57.9b(11.1)

27.2**

Pre-STAI-S

38.2a(9.4)

34.2a(9.7)

49.9b(12.3)

49.9b(16.5)

6.8**

Post-STAI-S

37.2a(8.5)

31.1a(8.5)

64.0b(9.7)

45.8c(16.0)

26.7**

Pre-MAACL-R

2.5a(3.3)

2.3a(3.4)

6.9b(6.1)

8.3b (7.7)

4.9**

Post-MAACL-R

2.9a(3.6)

1.3a(1.8)

11.3b(5.6)

8.3b(8.1)

12.3**

FNE

35.5a(7.5)

31.0a(6.6)

43.9b(10.6)

44.9b(6.5)

11.1**

Note. F represents the comparison between groups (high test-anxious versus low test-anxious). RTT:
Reactions to Tests (Benson, & Bandalos, 1992). STAI-T State Trait Anxiety Inventory – Trait/STAI-S:
State Trait Anxiety Inventory – State (Speilberger, 1983). MAACL-R: Multiple Affective Adjective
Checklist – Revised (Zuckerman, & Lubin, 1985). FNE: Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (Leary,
1983). **p < .01. Means with different subscripts differ significantly at the p < .05 level.
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Elevation of State Anxiety
STAI-S. To test if state anxiety was elevated prior to an exam (due to
exam stress), pre- and post-STAI-S were analyzed using an ANOVA with
repeated measures. Analyses demonstrated STAI-S scores was significantly
elevated at post-test from pre-evaluation for Group, F(3, 59) = 11.58, p < .001
and Condition, F(1, 60) = 24.13, p < .001. Furthermore, high test-anxious
participants in the test condition had a significant elevation in post-STAI -S
scores (compared to pre-STAI-S scores) compared to those low test-anxious
participants in the no test condition, F(1, 30) = 18.48, p < .001.
MAACL-R. Similar to the STAI-S, the MAACL-R was used to measure
an elevation in anxiety prior to an exam. Pre- and post-MAACL-R scores
were also analyzed using an ANOVA with repeated measures. Analyses
demonstrated that the increase of MAACL-R scores was also significantly
higher at post-evaluation from pre-evaluation for Group, F(1, 60) = 12.15, p =
.001, and Condition, F(1, 60) = 16.37, p < .001. Furthermore, high testanxious participants in the test condition had a significant elevation in postMAACL-R scores (compared to pre-MAACL-R scores) compared to those low
test-anxious participants in the no test condition, F(1, 30) = 19.54, p < .001.
Stroop Color-Naming Task
Between group analyses. Latencies for the mean color-naming
response times are summarized in Table 5. MANOVA was used in this
analysis to examine multiple dependent variables. Results showed no
significant differences of response times between high and low test-anxious
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participants for any dependent variable when examining Group or Condition.
However, General-Threat words (StroopGT) and Test-Threat words
(StroopTT) showed a trend of slower response latencies among high testanxious participants compared to low test-anxious participants (F(1, 30) =
2.97, p = .090 and F(1, 30) = 3.06, p = .086, respectively). Similarly,
StroopTT showed a trend for longer response latencies among participants in
the test condition compared to participants in the no test condition (F(1, 30) =
3.62, p = .062). Thus, these participants took longer to respond when they
were presented with threatening word stimuli (see Table 6). No significant
differences were shown for gender for any dependent variable.
Table 5. Stroop Color-Naming Task Mean Response Latencies in
Milliseconds
Group
Low Test-Anxious

High Test-Anxious

Condition
Test
Word Type

Condition
No Test

Test

M(SD)

No Test
M(SD)

StroopGT

701.1a(85.4)

696.6a(122.2)

790.2a(115.6)

708.1a(6.5)

StroopGTC

683.5a(109.7)

677.5a(130.8)

693.6a(129.0)

689.9a(127.3)

StroopTT

709.9a(98.1)

695.9a(116.4)

811.5a(156.5)

704.0a(118.4)

StroopTTC

676.7a(100.9)

675.3a(110.7)

687.7a(110.5)

688.5a(127.7)

Note. StroopGT: Stroop Color-Naming Task general-threat words. StroopGTC: general-threat words
control. StroopTT: test-threat words. StroopTTC: test-threat control words. Means having the same
subscripts are not significantly different at the p < .05 level.
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Table 6. Stroop Color-Naming Task Between Groups and Condition
Analyses
Group
Word Type

Condition

G+C

F(1, 60)

p

hp2

F(1, 60)

P

hp2

F(3, 59)

p

hp2

StroopGT

3.0

ns

0.1

2.2

Ns

0.0

2.6

ns

0.1

StroopGTC

0.1

ns

0.0

0.0

Ns

0.0

0.1

ns

0.0

StroopTT

3.1

ns

0.1

3.6

Ns

0.1

3.4

0.04*

0.1

StroopTTC

0.2

ns

0.0

0.0

Ns

0.0

0.9

ns

0.0

Note. F represents the comparison between groups (high test-anxious versus low test-anxious) and
conditions (test versus no test). G + C represents both group and condition. StroopGT: Stroop ColorNaming Task general-threat words. StroopGTC: general-threat words control. StroopTT: test-threat
words. StroopTTC: test-threat control words. *p < .05, **p < .01. hp2 (effect size): partial eta squared.

An ANCOVA demonstrated that high test-anxious participants in the
test condition had significantly longer response latencies on StroopTT (M =
811.52, SD = 156.45) compared to low test-anxious participants in the no test
condition (M = 695.92, SD = 116.40). Thus, those individuals were
significantly slower to name a color when a test-threatening word appeared
on the computer screen. Although not significant, there was a trend toward
longer response latencies on StroopGT words, meaning that these individuals
were slower to color-name general-threat words (F(3, 59) = 2.64 p = .082).
No significant differences were demonstrated for StroopTTC and StroopGTC
using ANCOVA (see Table 6). Figures 2-5 show mean response latencies in
milliseconds among high test-anxious versus low test-anxious participants
and among participants who will have an exam following the computer tasks
versus those who have no exams scheduled.
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Figure 2. Mean Response Latencies in Milliseconds for General-Threat
Words on the Stroop Task
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Figure 3. Mean Response Latencies in milliseconds for General-Threat
Control Words on the Stroop Task
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Figure 4. Mean Response Latencies in milliseconds for Test-Threat Words
on the Stroop Task
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Figure 5. Mean Response Latencies in milliseconds for Test-Threat Control
Words on the Stroop Task
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Within group analyses. An ANOVA using repeated measures analysis
showed significant within group differences, comparing StroopTT words (M =
759.52, SD = 147.50) and StroopTTC words (M = 688.12, SD = 117.08) when
examining high test-anxious participants only. Thus, high test-anxious
participants were significantly slower to respond to test-threat words
compared to test-threat control words. Furthermore, high test-anxious
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participants in the test condition were significantly slower than those in the no
test condition to respond to test-threat words (M = 811.52, SD = 156.45)
compared to test-threat control words (M = 687.73, SD = 110.47). When
comparing StroopGT words and StroopTT words, results demonstrated that
no significant differences existed among high test-anxious participants.
Similarly, no significant differences occurred when comparing StroopTT
words and StroopGT words among participants in the test condition (see
Table 7). ANCOVA using repeated measures showed that between testthreat words and general-threat words, holding STAI Trait constant, no
significant differences existed for Group F(1, 60) = 0.22, p = 0.36, Condition
F(1, 60) = 2.365, p = 0.13, or for high test-anxious in the test condition versus
low test-anxious in the no test condition, F(3, 59) = 2.35, p = 0.13.
Table 7. Stroop Color-Naming Task Within Groups and Condition Analyses
Among Test-Anxious Participants
Overall
Word Type
StroopTT – StroopTTC
StroopTT – StroopGT

Condition

F(1, 30)

p

hp2

F(1, 30)

P

hp2

15.5

0.00**

0.3

12.2

0.00**

0.3

0.7

ns

0.0

1.3

ns

0.0

Note. F represents the comparison overall (high test-anxious between word type) and conditions (test
versus no test). StroopGT: Stroop Color-Naming Task general-threat words. StroopGTC: generalthreat words control. StroopTT: test-threat words. StroopTTC: test-threat control words. *p < .05, **p
< .01. hp2 (effect size): partial eta squared.

Attentional Dot-Probe Task
The mean latencies for the dot-probe responses are summarized in
Table 8. Initial MANOVAs showed no significant differences between Groups
or Conditions for any dependent variable. However, when a test-threat word
was paired with a test-threat control word (dpTTTTC) and the probe replaced
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the test-threat word, there was a non-significant trend for shorter response
latencies among high test-anxious compared to low test-anxious participants
(F(1, 30) = 3.28, p = .075). Similarly, there was a trend for shorter response
latencies among participants in the test condition compared to participants in
the no test condition for dpTTTTC (F(1, 30) = 3.11, p = .083). Thus, these
participants were quicker to respond when the probe replaced threatening
stimuli. There were no significant differences if the probe replaced a threat
word at the top versus the bottom of the computer screen.
A similar trend was shown for longer response latencies when a testthreat control word was paired with a test-threat word (dpTTCTT) if the probe
replaced the test-threat control word among high test-anxious compared to
low test-anxious participants (F(1, 30) = 2.86, p = .096). In addition, there
was a trend for longer response latencies among participants in the test
condition compared to participants in the no test condition for dpTTCTT (F(1,
30) = 3.03, p < .087). Thus, these participants took longer to respond when
the probe replaced a test-threatening control word when it was paired with a
test-threat word. There were no significant differences if the probe replaced a
threat word at the top versus the bottom of the computer screen.
Differences in response latencies when a general-threat word was
paired with a general-threat control word, whether the probe replaced a
general-threat word (dpGTGTC) or a general-threat control word (dpGTCGT),
were non-significant for Groups or Conditions. Again, there were no
significant differences if the probe replaced either a general-threat word or a
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general-threat control word at the top versus the bottom of the computer
screen. There were no significant differences between Groups or Conditions
when a general-threat word was paired with a test-threat word, whether the
probe replaced a general-threat word (dpGTTT) or a test-threat word
(dpTTGT). No significant differences existed if the probe replaced either a
general-threat word or a test-threat word at the top versus the bottom of the
computer screen.
When a general-threat control word was paired with a test-threat
control word, whether the general-threat control word (dpGTCTTC) or the
test-threat control word (dpTTCGTC) was replaced by the probe, there were
no significant differences between Group or Condition. Again, there were no
significant differences if the probe replaced either a general-threat control
word or a test-threat control word at the top versus the bottom of the
computer screen (see Table 9). No significant differences where shown for
gender for any dependent variable.
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Table 8. Attentional Dot-Probe Mean Response Latencies in Milliseconds
Group

Word Pairs

Low Test-Anxious
Condition
Test
No Test
M(SD)

High Test-Anxious
Condition
Test
No Test
M(SD)

dpGTGTC

531.2a(38.2)

542.7a(31.1)

511.3a(60.0)

542.7a(31.1)

dpGTCGT

546.3a(31.3)

540.8a(32.7)

561.8a(36.9)

546.2a(30.5)

DpGTTT

539.5a(59.8)

543.1a(43.3)

561.5a(61.2)

537.8a(35.3)

DpTTGT

537.4a(62.6)

544.0a(51.6)

572.9a(65.3)

531.0a(58.8)

dpTTTTC

533.7a(36.4)

543.9a(41.1)

502.2a(53.5)

533.1a(50.6)

dpTTCTT

537.5a(43.3)

533.2a(37.4)

583.3a(69.9)

536.8a(45.0)

dpTTCGTC

562.2a(55.2)

565.4a(73.0)

568.9a(56.9)

564.7a(41.7)

Note. dpGTGTC: Attentional Dot-Probe Task general-threat word replaced probe paired with general-threat control
word. dpGTCGT: general-threat control word replaced probe paired with general-threat word. dpGTTT: generalthreat word replaced probe paired with test-threat word. dpTTGT test-threat word replaced probe paired with
general-threat word. dpTTTTC: test-threat word replaced probe paired with test-threat control word. dpTTCTT:
test-threat control word replaced probe paired with test-threat word. dpTTCGTC: test-threat control word replaced
probe 1/2 of the time paired with general-threat control word replaced probe the other 1/2 of the time. Means having
the same subscripts are not significantly different at the p < .05 level.

Table 9. Attentional Dot-Probe Task Between Groups and Condition
Analyses
Group

Condition

G+C

F(1, 60)

p

hp2

F(1, 60)

p

hp2

F(3, 59)

p

dpGTGTC

2.6

ns

0.0

1.7

ns

0.0

2.3

ns

0.1

dpGTCGT

1.5

ns

0.0

1.6

ns

0.0

01.6

ns

0.1

dpGTTT

0.4

ns

0.0

0.6

ns

0.0

0.5

ns

0.0

dpTTGT

0.6

ns

0.0

1.4

ns

0.0

1.0

ns

0.0

dpTTTTC

3.3

ns

0.1

3.1

ns

0.1

3.3

0.04*

0.1

dpTTCTT

2.9

ns

0.1

3.0

ns

0.1

3.0

ns

0.1

dpGTCTTC

0.0

ns

0.0

0.0

ns

0.0

0.0

ns

0.0

Word Type

hp2

Note. F represents the comparison between groups (high test-anxious versus low test-anxious) and
conditions (test versus no test). G + C represents predicting group and condition. Note. dpGTGTC:
Attentional Dot-Probe Task general-threat word replaced probe paired with general-threat control word.
dpGTCGT: general-threat control word replaced probe paired with general-threat word. dpGTTT:
general-threat word replaced probe paired with test-threat word. dpTTGT test-threat word replaced
probe paired with general-threat word. dpTTTTC: test-threat word replaced probe paired with testthreat control word. dpTTCTT: test-threat control word replaced probe paired with test-threat word.
dpTTCGTC: test-threat control word replaced probe 1/2 of the time paired with general-threat control
word replaced probe the other 1/2 of the time. *p < .05, **p < .01. hp2 (effect size): partial eta squared.
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ANCOVA, however, demonstrated that high test-anxious participants in
the test condition showed significantly shorter response latencies for
dpTTTTC words (M = 502.18, SD = 53.47) compared to low test-anxious
participants in the no test condition (M = 543.94, SD = 41.14). Although not
significant, a strong trend of longer response latencies for dpTTCTT
compared to low test-anxious participants in the test condition was also
shown F(3, 59) = 2.99, p = .058). Thus, those individuals were quicker to
respond when a test-threat word was paired with a test-threat control word
and the probe replaced the test-threat word. Similarly, when the probe
replaced the test-threat control word, participants were slower to respond;
however, not significantly. No significant differences were demonstrated for
dpGTGTC, dpGTCGT, dpGTTT, dpTTGT, dpGTCTTC, and dpTTCGTC using
a regression analysis (see Table 9). Figures 6-12 show mean response
latencies in milliseconds among high test-anxious versus low test-anxious
participants and among participants who will have an exam following the
computer tasks versus those who have no exams scheduled.
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Figure 6. Dot-Probe Attentional Task Mean Latencies in Milliseconds for
General-Threat Words (replaced by probe) Paired with General-Threat
Control Words
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Figure 7. Dot-Probe Attentional Task Mean Latencies in Milliseconds for
General-Threat Control Words (replaced by probe) Paired with GeneralThreat Words
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Figure 8. Dot-Probe Attentional Task Mean Latencies in Milliseconds for
General-Threat Words (replaced by probe) Paired with Test-Threat Words
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Figure 9. Dot-Probe Attentional Task Mean Latencies in Milliseconds for
Test-Threat Words (replaced by probe) Paired with General-Threat Words
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Figure 10. Dot-Probe Attentional Task Mean Latencies in Milliseconds for
Test-Threat Words (replaced by probe) Paired with Test-Threat Control
Words
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Figure 11. Dot-Probe Attentional Task Mean Latencies in Milliseconds for
Test-Threat Control Words (replaced by probe) Paired with Test-Threat
Words
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Figure 12. Dot-Probe Attentional Task Mean Latencies in Milliseconds for
General-Threat Control Words (replaced by probe 1/2 of the time) Paired with
Test-Threat Control Words (replaced by probe the other 1/2 of the time)
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Correlations
RTT. RTT total score and subtest scores all were significantly
positively correlated: worry r = .966, p < .001, tension r = .944, p < .001, testirrelevant thoughts r = .948, p < .001, and bodily symptoms r = .959, p < .001.
Please see Table 10 for separate intercorrelations of each of the RTT
subscales. RTT scores, total and subscales, and GPA produced no
significant correlations. RTT total score and all anxiety measures were
significantly positively correlated: STAI-T r = .760, p < .001, STAI-S pretest r
= .525, p < .001, STAI-S posttest r = .662, p < .001, MAACL-R pretest r =
.476, p < .001, MAACL-R posttest r = .613, p < .001, and FNE r = .531, p <
.001. RTT intercorrelations are summarized in Table 10.
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Table 10. RTT Intercorrelations
Variables

1

2

3

4

1.

RTT total

2.

RTT tension

.94**

-

3.

RTT worry

.97**

.92***

-

4.

RTT test irrelevant thoughts

.95**

.82**

.88**

-

5.

RTT bodily symptoms

.96**

.86**

.89**

.92**

5

-

-

**p < .01

Computer tasks. StroopGT showed a significant positive correlation
among some of the anxiety measures including: RTT worry, r =.291, p =
.022, RTT total, r = .250, p = .050, and MAACL-R posttest, r = .309, p = .014
StroopTT showed a significant positive correlation with the following anxiety
measures, RTT worry, r = .292, p = .021), RTT total, r = .251, p = .049, STAI
State posttest, r = .298, p = .019, STAI Trait, r = .271, p = .033, and MAACLR posttest, r = .371, p = .033. The dpTTTTC variable showed a significant
negative correlation with RTT tension, r = -.276, p = .030 and FNE, r = -.293,
p = .021.
Summary Results for Each Hypotheses
Hypothesis one. On the modified Stroop color-naming task, between
groups comparison showed no significant differences between high testanxious participants and low test-anxious participants for test-threatening
stimuli. Analyses, however, demonstrated that a trend did exist.
Hypothesis two. On the modified Stroop color-naming task, high testanxious participants demonstrated significant differences for response times
for test-threat words compared with test-threat control words. This was not
demonstrated for low test-anxious participants.
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Hypothesis three. On the modified Stroop color-naming task, high testanxious participants revealed no significant difference in response times for
test-threat words versus general-threat words.
Hypothesis four. In the attentional dot-probe task, the location of the
word and the probe did not have a significant effect on response latencies for
any dependent variable. However, a trend was present for test-threat words
when paired with test-threat control words for all participants.
Hypothesis five, exploratory hypothesis. Examining an elevation in
state anxiety in the Stroop color-naming tasks showed, among high testanxious (compared to low test-anxious) participants when they had an exam
soon following their participation, significantly longer response latencies for
words that contained test-threatening stimuli (hypothesis one). Similarly
among high test-anxious (compared to low test-anxious) participants,
although significant differences occurred regardless of an upcoming exam,
the occurrence of the examination immediately following their participation
produced more powerful results for test-threatening stimuli versus neutral
stimuli. Furthermore, although there was a trend, high test-anxious
participants showed no significant differences between test-threat words and
general-threat words (hypothesis three) even when there was an exam
pending.
Similarly, on the attentional dot-probe task, high test-anxious
participants who had an exam pending yielded significantly shorter response
latencies for test-threat words when paired with test-threat control words,
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showing that their attention was oriented toward test-threat words. No
significant differences existed between test-threat words when paired with
general-threat words prior to an exam.
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Chapter 4.
DISCUSSION
The primary purpose of the present study was to demonstrate
attentional bias for threatening information relative to the testing environment
among test-anxious participants. The investigation produced some
interesting results; some of which were expected and some were not. Three
primary findings are discussed.
Principal Findings and Implications
First finding. The results did not support some of the initial
hypotheses. First, hypothesis one predicted that on the modified Stroop
color-naming task, high test-anxious participants (compared to low testanxious participants) would demonstrate significantly longer response
latencies for test-threat words. Results showed response latencies between
high test-anxious and low test-anxious participants for test-threatening stimuli
were not significantly different. Although no statistically significant differences
were present, a trend was shown for high test-anxious participants to exhibit
longer response latencies for test-threat words.
Secondly, hypothesis four predicted that on the attentional dot-probe
task, response latencies would be shorter or longer relative to the location of
the word and the probe (e.g., high test-anxious participants’ attention should
be oriented towards the location and direction of threat words that are related
to the participants’ particular schema). Again, contrary to predictions, results
demonstrated that high test-anxious participants did not exhibit significantly
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different response latencies for test-threatening stimuli on the attentional dotprobe task. Although response latencies were not significantly different
between high and low test-anxious participants, there was a trend for high
test-anxious participants’ attention to be oriented toward test-threatening
stimuli when paired with control stimuli.
Both of these findings warrant some discussion. First, the lack of
significant differences between the high and low test-anxious individuals
responding to test-threatening stimuli is theorized in the literature that an
elevation in state anxiety is necessary to activate test-related schemas and to
reveal significant differences in performance (MacLeod & Mathews, 1988) on
computer tasks prior to an exam (hypothesis five, exploratory hypothesis).
In the present study, high test-anxious participants scored higher on a
state anxiety measure just prior to an exam compared to when they were
administered the same measure not followed by an exam, suggesting
successful elevation in state anxiety. With this elevation in state anxiety,
significant differences in response latencies for test-threatening stimuli were
found between high test-anxious participants and low test-anxious
participants when they had an exam immediately following the experiment.
Thus, high test-anxious participants took longer on the Stroop color-naming
task to respond to test-threat words compared to low test-anxious participants
prior to an exam. These longer response latencies support the theory that
high test-anxious individuals shift their attention toward threatening stimuli
(MacLeod et al., 1986) and therefore have an attentional bias for threat

85
(Taghavi et al., 1999). However, when no exam was imminent, even when
the individual scored high on test anxiety, there was no attentional bias for
test-threatening stimuli.
Similarly, on the attentional dot probe task, an elevation of state
anxiety is necessary for significant differences in response latencies to
emerge between high and low test-anxious individuals’ attention to orient
toward test-threatening stimuli. High test-anxious participants, just prior to an
exam, exhibited significantly different response latencies compared to low
test-anxious participants for test-threatening stimuli when paired with control
stimuli. The theory that high test-anxious individuals shift their attention
toward threatening stimuli (MacLeod et al., 1986) is due to an attentional bias
for test-related threat (Taghavi et al., 1999), is once again supported.
The necessity of an elevation of state anxiety has some relevance to
the activation hypothesis. Although the activation hypothesis predominately
refers to depressogenic patterns, it could also be applied to patterns of
anxiety. According to Beck (1983), cognitive schemas of depressive
individuals are typically latent and must be activated. However, when primed
and accessible, such patterns are hypothesized to produce cognitive
distortions that may cause symptoms of depression (Riskind & Rholes, 1984).
This would have important implications for the theory of test anxiety. Test
anxiety itself is typically latent unless primed (e.g., just prior to or during an
exam). Although the activation hypothesis was not specifically examined in
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the present study, it is worthy of further investigation to examine the effects of
distorted cognitions relative to the exam situation.
Second finding. Hypothesis three predicted that on the modified
Stroop color-naming task high test-anxious participants would demonstrate
significantly longer response latencies for threat words relative to their
specific anxiety-related schemas (e.g., high test-anxious participants should
have longer response latencies for test-threat words compared to generalthreat words). Contrary to predictions, the results demonstrated that high
test-anxious participants’ response latencies were not statistically different
between test-threatening stimuli and general-threatening stimuli on the Stroop
color-naming task (hypothesis three). Furthermore, the results were
unchanged and no significant differences were found among high testanxious participants between test-threat words and general-threat words even
if they had an upcoming exam.
One question arises from this unexpected finding that warrants some
discussion. If hypothesis three was supported and high test-anxious
individuals are sensitive only to environmental stimuli that are relative to their
specific anxiety-related schema (i.e., greater sensitivity to the test
environment compared to a general-threat), it could have suggested that test
anxiety is a separate entity, best classified separately from generalized
anxiety, social phobia, and specific phobia. However, since the results only
show a trend, is test anxiety indeed a separate entity from generalized anxiety
that warrants a separate classification?
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On face value, the answer to this question, according to hypothesis
three, should be “no”, and the results of this finding would suggest that high
test-anxious individuals are perhaps not necessarily sensitive only to
environmental stimuli relative to their specific anxiety related schema
(Williams et al., 1997). However, despite the fact that high test-anxious
participants did not respond with significantly longer latencies to test-threat
words compared with general-threat words, it does not necessarily mean that
no sensitivity to anxiety relative schema exists. It should be noted that in the
previous finding, high test-anxious participants were specifically sensitive to
test-threatening stimuli compared to control stimuli (e.g., responding slower to
test-threat words compared to control words). This was not evident between
general-threat words and general-threat control words. These data suggest
that there is some sensitivity to specific anxiety related schema.
Anticipatory anxiety could also explain the lack of significant difference
between test-threat words and general-threat words. Anticipatory anxiety is
the anxiety that an individual usually experiences before a challenging activity
(Chua, Krames, Toni, Passingham, & Dolan, 1999), or in this case, an exam.
Most often, anticipatory anxiety is at a substantially greater level than what an
individual would actually experience during an exam. Thus, anticipatory
anxiety may influence response latencies toward general-threat words as
well.
Another point that warrants some discussion is the discovery that low
test-anxious and high test-anxious groups demonstrated significant
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differences on a trait anxiety measure. This finding would suggest that testanxious participants are also highly anxious in general. Thus, it would
demonstrate that the general-threat words would also be salient for them.
This point will be given further elaboration later in the methodological
limitations. Of course, more research is needed to further investigate the
classification of test anxiety.
Third finding. One finding that was consistent with predictions
supported hypothesis two. This hypothesis predicted that on the modified
Stroop color-naming task, high test-anxious participants (compared to low
test-anxious participants) would demonstrate significantly longer response
latencies for test-threat words when compared to test-threat control (neutral)
words due to the focus on the threat. Consistent with predictions, results
showed that high test-anxious participants were significantly slower to
respond to test-threatening stimuli compared to control stimuli.
This was an interesting finding, although somewhat contradictory to
hypothesis five, which required an upcoming exam to elevate state anxiety to
reveal significant differences. Present findings demonstrate that among high
test-anxious participants, and when comparing the words themselves (testthreatening stimuli compared with control stimuli), an elevation in state
anxiety is not necessary to activate an individual’s test-related schema. It
also appears that high test-anxious individuals are sensitive to test-related
threat whether or not they are shown to be high versus low in state anxiety
(i.e., have an upcoming exam or not). When high test-anxious participants
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were examined just prior to an exam, they also took longer to respond to a
test-threat word compared to a control word.
Present findings suggest that the words themselves distract high testanxious participants and their attention is oriented toward the test-threat word.
Similar to individuals with depression and anxiety disorders, test-anxious
students may have a tendency to use a disproportionate amount of their
cognitive resources focusing on threat and task irrelevant concerns (Eysenck,
1992; Muller, 1992, Zeidner, 1980). Furthermore, high test-anxious
individuals have an increased susceptibility to distraction when receiving an
anxiety-provoking stressor (Keogh, & French, 2001). These findings are
consistent with previous research examining children (Alting, & Markham,
1993) and college students (Keogh, & French, 2001) that showed participants
had high distractibility toward threatening stimuli (e.g., test-threat), thus
having selective bias toward threatening cues.
Overall, this study gave evidence suggesting that high test-anxious
individuals are distracted by threatening stimuli (e.g., words containing testthreat) and are likely to interpret these stimuli as potential threat (Eysenck,
1992; Mathews & MacLeod, 1985). Thus, high test-anxious individuals
demonstrated an attentional bias for test-threatening stimuli.
Methodological Limitations
First, the lack of significant findings among high test-anxious
individuals for test-threat words versus general-threat words warrants some
discussion. First, as was mentioned previously, the lack of significance is
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likely due to high test-anxious participants being also highly anxious in
general, as demonstrated on a trait anxiety measure. Thus these individuals
are also likely to be as sensitive to general-threat words as they are to testthreat words. It would have been desirable to separate out general-anxious
individuals (high trait anxiety scores) from high test-anxious individuals (high
RTT scores) who were not highly anxious in general (low trait anxious). In
retrospect, this would have been the ideal. However, since trait anxiety and
test anxiety highly correlate this might have been difficult. Perhaps this
should be pursued in further studies on test anxiety.
Second, it would have been informative to include a group of
individuals who met criteria for an anxiety disorder to further evaluate
sensitivity to one’s own anxiety-related schema. However, given the limited
time and resources, it would not have been manageable to recruit such a
group and proceed with diagnosis or assessment to determine inclusive
criteria. Since this study was specifically examining attentional bias among
test-anxious individuals, not including such a group was justified. However,
comparing general-anxious and test-anxious individuals is worthy for future
investigation.
Third, in retrospect, it would have been useful to have the participants
in the test condition (exam immediately following the experiment) complete a
post-exam questionnaire inquiring about their exam experience, including
exam grade. With this information, correlational analyses could have been
conducted to investigate whether test performance and test anxiety, including
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the sub-components of test anxiety measured by the RTT, were correlated.
Although previous research has established that test performance is not
correlated with emotionality (Morris & Perez, 1972) and is correlated with
worry (Spielberger & Vagg, 1995), it would have been favorable here to
investigate the correlation of test-irrelevant thoughts, bodily symptoms, and
test performance.
Fourth, it would have been useful to request the participants to indicate
the length of time they prepared for their upcoming exam, on the post
questionnaire. This would help to tease out some potential confounds of the
study, including poor study habits that may have affected one group or
condition differentially. That is, if the participants spend little time preparing,
are they likely to exhibit some attentional bias prior to an exam independently
of their test anxiety assessed by the RTT? This could be an interesting follow
up study.
Lastly, some information could have been gained by including other
demographic variables such as ethnicity. Previous research that examined
predictor variables such as ethnicity has shown that, for instance, Hawaiian
students have higher anxiety scores measured by the STAI compared to
Japanese students (Hishinuma, Miyamoto, Nishimura, & Nahulu, 2000).
When specifically examining test anxiety for a statistics course, ethnicity was
a factor that affected outcome results (Baloglu, & Zelhart, 2003). Further testanxiety studies should include predictor variables such as ethnicity to
examine such affects.
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Recent Developments
Researchers have been interested in the emotional reactions of
students while taking exams since the beginning of last century. The interest
in test anxiety produced a wealth of information that focused on how test
anxiety relates to performance. In the 1950s and subsequent years, specific
measures in test anxiety were developed in hopes of measuring test anxiety
separately from other anxiety disorders (Stober & Pekrun, 2004). In the
1960s and 1970s, major advancements included distinctions between state
and trait anxiety (Cattell & Scheier, 1966; Spielberger, 1966) and distinctions
between worry and emotionality (Liebert & Morris, 1967). The developments
in the 1970s and 1980s showed developments in model construction,
specifically cognitive models and the role attention plays in test anxiety
(Zeidner, 1998). The number of scientific publications on test anxiety began
to decrease after its peak in the 1980s. However, in recent years the study of
test anxiety is still flourishing and has shown some promising developments
(Stober & Pekrun, 2004) in coping, performance, and self-control. These
deserve further discussion.
First, researchers are now examining practical interventions that
address test anxiety such as coping strategies. For instance, Stober (2004)
examined four dimensions of test anxiety that varied somewhat from
Sarason’s (1984) RTT. The four dimensions include worry (concerns about
being evaluated and consequences of failure), emotionality (perception of
autonomic reactions that are evoked by the exam), interference
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(preoccupation of intrusive thoughts), and lack of confidence (belief that
failure is imminent), all of which influence coping strategies for pre-test
anxiety and uncertainty.
Stober (2004) outlined three strategy types: task orientation and
preparation, seeking social support, and avoidance. One hundred sixty-two
students were administered a multidimensional measure of test anxiety and
they were asked about their coping strategies regarding pre-exam anxiety
and uncertainty. Results showed that different dimensions of test anxiety
reveal relationships with coping strategies, along with significant gender
differentiations. First, it was found that worry correlated with preparation and
avoidance among females. Second, emotionality correlated with seeking
social support in males and preparation among females. Third, lack of
confidence correlated with avoidance among females. These results suggest
that the main components of coping with test anxiety display different
relationships with coping strategies (Stober, 2004).
Second, researchers have reexamined the relationship between test
anxiety and performance, along with significant gender effects. Although the
present study lacks significant findings when examining GPA and test anxiety
measured by the RTT and gender effects, only 62 participants were examined
and the female-male split was not equal. Nevertheless, other research has
shown that these relationships do exist.
One such project (Chapel, Blanding, Silverstein, Takahashi, Newman,
Gubi, & McCann, 2005) evaluated 5,414 participants. Participants were
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asked to provide their cumulative GPAs. Participants were also administered
a measure of test anxiety. Results showed that among graduate students,
low test-anxious females had significantly higher GPAs compared to high
test-anxious females. However, no differences were shown among males.
Furthermore, it was shown that females had significantly higher GPAs and
test anxiety scores than males. This research demonstrated the influence of
gender differences and supports the theory that test anxiety is related to
performance.
Third, researchers (Oaten & Cheng, 2005) examined how test anxiety
impairs self-control. Self-regulation is a process that involves the ability to
alter thought processes, emotions, and behaviors. Participants taking exams
were compared to those who did not have upcoming exams. They examined
regulatory behaviors (e.g., consumption, physical activity, self-care, spending
habits, emotional control, sleep patterns, keeping appointments), depression,
trait anxiety, self-control, perceived stress, emotional distress, and
performance on a modified version of a Stroop color-word task.
Results demonstrated that participants with test anxiety show
breakdowns in self-control behaviors and impaired functioning on the Stroop
task (e.g., longer response latencies in color naming) that were not evident in
the control group. Self-control behaviors included changes in consumption
behaviors (e.g., smoking, caffeine, junk food), physical activity (e.g.,
frequency and duration of exercise), self-care (e.g., brushing teeth, changing
clothes), household chores (e.g., laundry, dishes), and regulatory behaviors
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(e.g., emotional control, sleeping in). Perceived stress and emotional distress
also changed from their baselines. The control group showed no such
changes, suggesting that during stressful life events, such as upcoming
exams, self-regulation may begin to fail (e.g., self-care, drinking, smoking)
where control was once successful prior to the stress.
Other developments related to the present study include reexamining
the Stroop task. Researchers (Algom, Chajut, & Lev, 2004) examined the
emotional Stroop phenomenon that challenged the selective attention
mechanism. The Stroop effect is the difference in performance of colornaming between congruent (e.g., the word green printed in green ink) and
incongruent (e.g., the word green printed in red ink) stimuli. Differences in
performance are a result of selective attention. The emotional Stroop effect,
on the other hand, is the difference in performance of color-naming neutral
(e.g., the word flower) and emotionally salient (e.g., the word snake) stimuli.
Differences in performance are due to inhibitory mechanism (e.g., reading) or
a slowdown effect, which is different than selective attention.
Algom et al. (2004) implemented several experiments addressing
various components of the emotional Stroop effect. Results revealed some
interesting conclusions demonstrating that the Stroop effect and the
emotional Stroop effect are independent of one another. First, it was
demonstrated that the effect of the emotional Stroop task was not sensitive to
task-irrelevant variation (e.g., emotional stimuli hindered both color-naming
and reading), suggesting a generic slowdown, not selective attention.
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Reading was hindered regardless of word length, frequency, category, or
abstractness. Results also demonstrated that an emotional delay is present
when a lexical decision task is replaced with reading, and that the effect is
present with alternating tasks. These findings suggest that instead of a
selective attention mechanism that accounts for the emotional Stroop effect, it
is more reasonable to assume that a threat-driven slowdown is responsible.
Since this study challenges some classic findings, researchers of this study
suggest separating the classic Stroop effect from the emotional Stroop effect
in that there are two entities that deserve separate attention (Algom et al.,
2004).
The present findings, using an emotional Stroop color-naming task,
demonstrated that an attentional bias among test-anxious individuals exists
when state anxiety is induced. These findings suggest that test-anxious
individuals “selectively attend” to test-threatening stimuli. However, this
statement cannot yet be affirmed with respect to selective attention and
current methodology implemented in the present study. Rather, what can be
proven and what the data reveal about test-anxious individuals, is a slowdown
effect when color-naming emotionally salient stimuli (e.g., test-threat words).
Whether these results were influenced by a generic slowdown versus
selective attention is yet to be fully understood and more research is
encouraged in this area.
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Future Directions
Demonstrating attentional bias among test-anxious individuals has
some important implications for future study. First, it would be informative to
continue the investigation of attentional bias relative to individual’s schemas.
That is, are test-anxious individuals more sensitive to test-threat stimuli
compared to general-threat stimuli? Although this was not found to be the
case in the present study, possibly due to some methodological limitations, it
would still be worthy of investigation. This could prove valuable in the
classification of test anxiety separate from other areas of anxiety.
Furthermore, the classification of test anxiety can ultimately lead to effective
treatments for test-anxious students.
Second, since an elevation in state anxiety is necessary for attentional
bias among test-anxious individuals, investigation of specific anxiety related
triggers would be an informative study. Thus, what elements of the upcoming
exam trigger an elevation in state anxiety? Future studies could examine
specific elements of an upcoming exam including the environment, lack of
preparedness, other students, the instructor, ruminating thoughts of failure,
and the dread of physiological reactions such as panic. Once these elements
are better understood, effective coping strategies could be implemented in an
attempt to reduce state anxiety prior to an upcoming exam.
Finally, the more that is learned about test anxiety, the more practical
applications toward treating test anxiety should be investigated. More
research is needed to investigate a student’s strengths and weaknesses
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when taking an exam in order to develop effective treatments. The
implications of the present study could guide the development of new
assessment devices and treatment approaches that focus on the specific
needs of students whose performance is not dependent upon ability,
intelligence, or study habits. The results of the present study implicating the
role of attentional bias should further the development of treatment strategies
that emphasize stress reduction, focused attention, and task relevant testtaking skills (Keogh & French, 2001) as well as appropriate study habits.
Demonstrating the impact of stress and how it relates to situational anxiety
could also guide treatment strategies. Investigating attentional bias among
test-anxious participants can be quite informative with respect to maintenance
and reinforcement of anxiety.
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Appendix A
General Information Forms
Participant #

Pre-screening Contact Form
This form will be kept separate and confidential form other materials. Your
name will only be used to contact you by email to inquire of your interest in
participating in the second part of the experiment.
Name:
Email Address or Fist Class name (e.g., John H. Smith)

Psychology Course Number and section (e.g., PSY 100 02):
Course Instructor:
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Participant #

Demographic Information
1.

What is your age?

2.

What is your gender? Circle one
Male
Female

3.

What is your current cumulative GPA, if unsure estimate?

4.

What is your class status? Circle one
Freshman
Sophomore
Junior
Senior
Graduate Student

5.

Do you suffer from color blindness? Circle one
YES
NO

6.

Are you currently taking any psychotropic medications? Circle one
YES
NO

7.

Would you be willing to participate one hour prior to an exam?
YES
NO
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Measures
Participant #

Reactions to Test – Abbreviated Form
(Developed by Sarason, 1984 and revised by Benson & Bandalos, 1992)

Below are statements that may or may not be relevant to you. Based on your personal experience,
please indicate how frequently you experience these feelings or thoughts during testing situations.
Please use the scale below and circle the number that best reflects how frequently you experience these
responses.
Not at all typical
of me
1

Only somewhat typical of
me
2

Quite typical
of me
3

Very typical
of me
4

1.

I feel distressed and uneasy before a test.

1

2

3

4

2.

I feel jittery before tests.

1

2

3

4

3.

While taking a test, I feel tense.

1

2

3

4

4.

I am anxious about tests.

1

2

3

4

5.

I have uneasy feelings before an important test.

1

2

3

4

6.

The thought, “What happens if I fail this test?” goes through
my mind during tests.

1

2

3

4

7.

During a difficult test, I worry whether I will pass it.

1

2

3

4

8.

While taking tests, I find myself thinking how much brighter other
people are.

1

2

3

4

9.

After a test, I say to myself, “It’s over and I did as well as I could.

1

2

3

4

10.

Thoughts of doing poorly interfere with my concentration during
tests.

1

2

3

4

11.

During tests I think of how poorly I am doing.

1

2

3

4

12.

During tests I find myself thinking of things unrelated to the
material being tested.

1

2

3

4

13.

I think about current events during a test.

1

2

3

4

14.

I have fantasies a few times during a test.

1

2

3

4

15.

While taking tests, I sometimes think about being somewhere else.

1

2

3

4

16.

During tests, I find I am distracted by thoughts of upcoming events.

1

2

3

4

17.

I feel the need to go to the toilet more often.

1

2

3

4

18.

I get a headache before a test.

1

2

3

4

19.

My mouth feels dry during a test.

1

2

3

4

20.

I sometimes find myself trembling before or during tests.

1

2

3

4
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SELF-EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE STAI Form Y-1
DIRECTIONS
MODERATELY SO

VERY MUCH SO

1.

I feel calm...........................................................................................................................1

2

3

4

2.

I feel secure ........................................................................................................................1

2

3

4

3.

I am tense ...........................................................................................................................1

2

3

4

4.

I feel strained......................................................................................................................1

2

3

4

5.

I feel at ease........................................................................................................................1

2

3

4

6.

I feel upset ..........................................................................................................................1

2

3

4

7.

I am presently worrying over possible misfortunes..........................................................1

2

3

4

8.

I feel satisfied .....................................................................................................................1

2

3

4

9.

I feel frightened..................................................................................................................1

2

3

4

10.

I feel comfortable...............................................................................................................1

2

3

4

11.

I feel self-confident............................................................................................................1

2

3

4

12.

I feel nervous......................................................................................................................1

2

3

4

13.

I am jittery ..........................................................................................................................1

2

3

4

14.

I feel indecisive ..................................................................................................................1

2

3

4

15.

I am relaxed........................................................................................................................1

2

3

4

16.

I feel content...................................................................................................................... 1

2

3

4

17.

I am worried .......................................................................................................................1

2

3

4

18.

I feel confused....................................................................................................................1

2

3

4

19.

I feel steady ........................................................................................................................1

2

3

4

20.

I feel pleasant .....................................................................................................................1

2

3

4

NOT AT ALL

SOMEWHAT

A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given
below. Read each statement and then circle the appropriate number to the right of
the statement to indicate how you feel right now, that is, at this moment. There are
no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement but
give the answer which seems to describe your present feelings best.
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SELF-EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE

STAI Form Y-2

DIRECTIONS

SOMEWHAT

VERY MUCH SO

NOT AT ALL

A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves
are given below. Read each statement and then circle the appropriate
number to the right of the statement to indicate how you generally feel.

21.

I feel Pleasant.......................................................................................................................1

2

3

4

22.

I feel nervous and restless....................................................................................................1

2

3

4

23.

I feel satisfied with myself ..................................................................................................1

2

3

4

24.

I wish I could be as happy as others seem to be .................................................................1

2

3

4

25.

I feel like a failure................................................................................................................1

2

3

4

26.

I feel rested...........................................................................................................................1

2

3

4

27.

I am “calm, cool, and collected” .........................................................................................1

2

3

4

28.

I feel that difficulties are piling up so that I cannot overcome them .................................1

2

3

4

29.

I worry too much over something that really doesn’t matter .............................................1

2

3

4

30.

I am happy............................................................................................................................1

2

3

4

31.

I have disturbing thoughts ...................................................................................................1

2

3

4

32.

I lack self-confidence...........................................................................................................1

2

3

4

33.

I feel secure ..........................................................................................................................1

2

3

4

34.

I make decisions easily ........................................................................................................1

2

3

4

35.

I feel inadequate...................................................................................................................1

2

3

4

36.

I am content..........................................................................................................................1

2

3

4

37.

Some unimportant thoughts runs through my mind and bothers me.................................1

2

3

4

38.

I take disappointments so keenly that I can’t put them out of my mind............................1

2

3

4

39.

I am a steady person ............................................................................................................1

2

3

4

40.

I get in a state of tension or turmoil as I think over my recent concerns and interests .....1

2

3

4
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The Multiple Affect Adjective Check List (MAACL)
DIRECTIONS
Please check off of the words below which describe how you feel right now at
the present moment.

o Active
o Afraid
o Aggressive
o Alone
o Annoyed
o Anxious
o Apprehensive
o Bored
o Calm
o Complaining
o Confused
o Content
o Critical
o Cross
o Cruel
o Daring
o Destroyed
o Disagreeable
o Disgusted
o Distraught
o Distracted
o Enthusiastic
o Fearful
o Forlorn
o Free
o Freaked
o Friendly
o Frightened
o Furious
o Good
o Jittery
o Joyful
o Hopeless

o Hopeless
o Hopeful
o Happy
o Hostile
o Horrified
o Humored
o Incensed
o Interested
o Lonely
o Lost
o Loving
o Mad
o Mean
o Merry
o Mild
o Miserable
o Nervous
o Panicky
o Peaceful
o Polite
o Rejected
o Satisfied
o Scared
o Secure
o Shaky
o Suffering
o Tame
o Tender
o Tense
o Understanding
o Whole
o Wild
o Worried
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FEAR OF NEGATIVE EVALUATION SCALE (FNE)
Please read each of the following statements carefully and indicate how characteristic
it is of you according to the following scale:
1 – Not at all characteristic of me.
2 – Slightly characteristic of me.
3 – Moderately characteristic of me.
4 – Very characteristic of me.
5 – Extremely characteristic of me.
1). I worry about what other people think of me even when
I know it doesn’t make any difference.

1

2

3

4

5

2). I am unconcerned even if I know people are forming
an unfavorable opinion of me.

1

2

3

4

5

3). I am frequently afraid of other people noticing my
shortcomings.

1

2

3

4

5

4). I rarely worry about what kind of impression I am
making on someone.

1

2

3

4

5

5). I am afraid that others will not approve of me.

1

2

3

4

5

6). I am afraid that others will find fault with me.

1

2

3

4

5

7). Other peoples’ opinions of me do not bother me.

1

2

3

4

5

8). When I am talking to someone, I worry about what they
may be thinking of me.

1

2

3

4

5

9). I am usually worried about what kind of impression I
make.

1

2

3

4

5

10). If I know someone is judging me, it has little effect on
me.

1

2

3

4

5

11). Sometimes I think I am too concerned about what
other people think of me.

1

2

3

4

5

12). I often worry that I will say or do the wrong things.

1

2

3

4

5
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Stroop Color-Naming Task and Attentional Dot-Probe Task Word List
(category, mean emotional rating, and number of letters)
Nbr of
Letters
8
5
9
6
5
6
5
5
7
8
4
5
6
7
6
6
4
6
3
3
6
9
7
9
6
10
5
6
7
4
7
6
7
5
7

Word
Accident
Alone
Ambulance
Coffin
Crash
Deadly
Death
Abuse
Disease
Distress
Rape
Fatal
Fright
Illness
Insane
Murder
Pain
Scared
Kill
War
Cancer
Slaughter
Trapped
Suffocate
Poison
Discomfort
Drown
Jitters
Seizure
Sick
Spiders
Stroke
Trouble
Snake
Falling

Word
Category
General-Threat
General-Threat
General-Threat
General-Threat
General-Threat
General-Threat
General-Threat
General-Threat
General-Threat
General-Threat
General-Threat
General-Threat
General-Threat
General-Threat
General-Threat
General-Threat
General-Threat
General-Threat
General-Threat
General-Threat
General-Threat
General-Threat
General-Threat
General-Threat
General-Threat
General-Threat
General-Threat
General-Threat
General-Threat
General-Threat
General-Threat
General-Threat
General-Threat
General-Threat
General-Threat

Rating
3.67
3.17
3.33
3.92
2.58
3.75
4.24
3.50
3.00
3.00
4.67
3.50
3.67
3.42
3.33
3.83
3.83
3.50
3.67
4.24
3.67
4.17
3.00
4,24
3.92
2.83
3.00
2.67
2.83
2.42
2.58
2.92
3.09
2.58
2.83

Nbr of
Letters
8
5
9
6
5
6
5
5
7
8
4
5
6
7
6
6
4
6
3
3
6
9
7
9
6
10
5
5
7
4
7
7
7
5
7

Word
Calendar
Coast
Butterfly
Camera
Chair
Handle
Jeans
Elbow
Sticker
Elephant
Glue
Grass
Coffee
Dresser
Penny
Pencil
Belt
Finger
Map
Pen
Candle
Triangles
Network
marketing
Tissue
Evaluation
Final
Grades
Nervous
Pass
Tension
College
Failure
Essay
Mistake

Word Category
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Test-Threat
Test-Threat
Test-Threat
Test-Threat
Test-Threat
Test-Threat
Test-Threat
Test-Threat
Test-Threat
Test-Threat

Rating
0.750
0.167
0.250
0.667
0
0.333
0.167
0.083
0.333
0
0.083
0
1.08
0
0.833
0
0.083
0.333
0.667
0.833
0.667
0.667
1.00
0.333
0.667
2.75
3.41
3.33
3.58
2.75
3.17
3.08
4.50
2.67
2.33
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Stroop Color-Naming Task and Attentional Dot-Probe Task Word List
continued.
Nbr of
Letters
9
4
4
4
5
5
9
8
5
4
11
5
10
9
11
8
4
8
8
5
8
12
6
4
5
5
4
3
5
4
6
4
4
5
5

Word
Challenge
Mind
Time
Test
Panic
Worry
Confusion
Cramming
Doubt
Exam
Frustration
Hurry
Incomplete
Incorrect
Performance
Problems
Quiz
Remember
Studying
Wrong
Memorize
Intelligence
Stupid
Math
Error
Plant
Plug
Ear
Stamp
Hair
Zipper
Clip
Door
Shirt
Apple

Word
Category
Test-Threat
Test-Threat
Test-Threat
Test-Threat
Test-Threat
Test-Threat
Test-Threat
Test-Threat
Test-Threat
Test-Threat
Test-Threat
Test-Threat
Test-Threat
Test-Threat
Test-Threat
Test-Threat
Test-Threat
Test-Threat
Test-Threat
Test-Threat
Test-Threat
Test-Threat
Test-Threat
Test-Threat
Test-Threat
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control

Rating
3.08
2.92
2.33
3.67
4.42
3.25
2.67
2.58
2.67
3.25
3.33
2.33
2.50
2.97
3.00
3.17
2.67
2.67
2.42
3.17
2.97
2.58
3.33
3.00
2.67
1.08
.083
.333
.250
.833
.333
0
.417
.167
.500

Nbr of
Letters
9
4
4
4
5
5
9
8
5
4
11
5
10
9
11
8
4
8
8
5
8
12
6
4
5
5
4
3
5
4
6
4
4
5
5

Word
Spaghetti
Tape
Soda
Shoe
Tulip
Table
Cucumbers
Pinecone
Water
Sock
Specialized
Radio
Taillights
Firelight
Associative
Eggplant
Tree
Blankets
Speakers
Rayon
Arkansas
Breadbaskets
Purely
Hull
Phone
Purse
Sack
Mud
Brick
Hair
Letter
Open
Lace
Stairs
Seeds

Word
Category
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control
Neutral/Control

Rating
0.333
0.250
0
0.167
0.250
0.083
0
0
0.417
0
1.00
0.500
0.500
1.17
0.833
0.083
0.417
0.417
1.08
0
0.250
0.417
0.417
0.833
0.500
.083
.333
.750
.500
.417
.667
.417
.250
.167
0
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Appendix D
Consent and Debriefing Forms
“Pre-Screening Test Anxiety Study”
Consent and Debriefing Form
I am Darla Lawson, a doctoral student in the Psychology Department here at the University of
Maine. I am conducting an experiment, and I would welcome your participation if you are an
adult (age 18 or older, or provide a signed permission slip), meet initial criteria based upon
the questionnaire assessment, and a student enrolled in a psychology course. Thank you for
expressing interest in this study. My colleagues and I are interested in test anxiety. It is
believed that students with test anxiety often have difficulties taking examinations. The
purpose of this study is to examine distractions and attention among students who are testanxious.
What will you be asked to do?
I will be asked to complete a series of questionnaires that measure levels of anxiety. For
example “I feel nervous”, “I often worry that I will say or do the wrong things”, and “While
taking a test, I feel tense.” If any of the questions are too disturbing or upsetting, I have the
option of leaving these questions blank
Risks
One risk of this study is that I may feel uncomfortable or anxious at some point during the
questionnaires. However, I will not be required to do anything that is considered to be unduly
stressful than are typically experienced in daily life.
Voluntary
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw my participation at any
time without loss of experimental credit. You may leave any test item blank.
Benefits
You will receive 1 experimental credit for participating in this portion of the study. Your
responses will help the researchers to learn more about test anxiety so that we may help
students to ease their anxiety during testing situations.
Confidentiality
All of the information that I provide will be kept confidential. Questionnaires will be identified
by a number code only (e.g., 012). My name that I provide to receive my credit hours will be
kept separate from all other identifying information.
Who do I contact if I have questions?
If you have any questions about this study, please contact Darla Lawson via First Class email
at darla_lawson@umit.maine.edu. If you have any questions about your rights as a research
participant, please contact Gayle Anderson at Research and Sponsored Programs: (207)
581-1498, 415 Corbett Hall, Campus or on First Class (Gayle Anderson).
Thank you for your interest in this study.
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“Test Anxiety Study”
Consent and Debriefing Form
I am Darla Lawson, a doctoral student in the Psychology Department here at the University of
Maine. I am conducting an experiment, and I would welcome your participation if you are an
adult (age 18 or older, or provide a signed permission slip), meet initial criteria based upon
the questionnaire assessment, and a student enrolled in a psychology course. Thank you for
expressing interest in this study. My colleagues and I are interested in test anxiety. It is
believed that students with test anxiety often have difficulties taking examinations. The
purpose of this study is to examine distractions and attention among students who are testanxious.
What will you be asked to do?
I will be asked to complete a series of questionnaires that measure levels of anxiety. For
example “I feel nervous”, “I often worry that I will say or do the wrong things”, and “While
taking a test, I feel tense.” If any of the questions are too disturbing or upsetting, I have the
option of leaving these questions blank. I will then be asked to complete a series of computer
tasks. For example, identifying a color of a word or responding to a probe (*) that appears on
the screen. The study will require approximately two hours of my time to which I will earn two
credit-hours to apply towards my psychology course.
Risks
One risk of this study is that I may feel uncomfortable or anxious at some point during the
questionnaires or computer tasks. However, I will not be required to do anything that is
considered to be unduly stressful than are typically experienced in daily life.
Voluntary
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw my participation at any
time without loss of experimental credit. You may leave any test item blank.
Benefits
You will receive 3 experimental credits for participating in this portion of the study. Your
responses will help the researchers to learn more about test anxiety so that we may help
students to ease their anxiety during testing situations.
Confidentiality
All of the information that I provide will be kept confidential. Questionnaires will be identified
by a number code only (e.g., 012). My name that I provide to receive my credit hours will be
kept separate from all other identifying information.
Who do I contact if I have questions?
If you have any questions about this study, please contact Darla Lawson via First Class email
at darla_lawson@umit.maine.edu. If you have any questions about your rights as a research
participant, please contact Gayle Anderson at Research and Sponsored Programs: (207)
581-1498, 415 Corbett Hall, Campus or on First Class (Gayle Anderson).
Thank you for your interest in this study.
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